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ARTICLES 
“DEPENDENT CONTRACTORS” IN THE GIG 
ECONOMY:  A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
MIRIAM A. CHERRY AND ANTONIO ALOISI* 
In recent years, lawsuits alleging the misclassification of workers as 
“independent contractors” rather than “employees” have become widespread in 
the United States.  Determining employee status is important because such 
status is a gateway to many substantive legal rights.  In response, some 
commentators have proposed an in-between hybrid category just for the gig 
economy. However, such an intermediate category is not new. In fact, it has 
existed in many countries for decades, producing successful results in some 
and misadventure in others. We use a comparative approach to analyze the 
experiences of Canada, Italy, and Spain with the intermediate category. In 
Italy, the quasi-subordinate category created an opportunity for arbitrage that 
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resulted in less worker protection. The end result was confusion, and since 
2015, the third category’s use has been extremely limited. Spain’s third 
category, the TRADE, was only made available to a small percentage of self-
employed workers because of the burdensome nature of its regulations and the 
high dependency threshold required for inclusion. As for Canada, the practical 
result of the “dependent contractor” category was to expand the definition of 
employee and to bring more workers under the ambit of labor law protection. 
We ultimately conclude that workable proposals for a third category must also 
encompass other forms of precarious employment.  Working within the existing 
framework, one solution would be to change the default 
presumptions regarding the two categories that already exist. Above a 
minimum threshold of hours worked or income earned, the default rule would 
be an employment relationship for most gig workers except those that may fit 
into a “safe harbor” for de minimis amateurs or volunteers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recently, there has been a spate of lawsuits across the United States 
alleging that platforms in the “on demand” economy have misclassified 
their workers as independent contractors.1  In response to the 
litigation and widespread confusion about how these workers should 
be classified, there have been proposals for a “third” or “hybrid” 
category to be created in the United States, situated between the 
categories of “employee” and “independent contractor.”  Regardless of 
whether these workers would be denominated “dependent 
contractors” or “independent workers,” these proposals for 
establishing a hybrid category have sparked debate and controversy.2  
Proponents advocate that an intermediate category is necessary for the 
modern economic and technological realities of the gig economy.  
They also suggest that a third category is a novel innovation, 
appropriately crafted for the era of digital platform work.3 
In fact, the intermediate category between employee and 
independent contractor is not new.  Many foreign legal systems have 
already had decades of experience with implementing an 
intermediate category.4  In this Article we employ a comparative 
approach and examine the laws of three countries that have such 
                                                          
 1. For a listing of the ongoing litigation surrounding the on-demand economy, 
see Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification:  The Digital Transformation of Work, 37 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 584–85 (2016). 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. See, e.g., Vin Gurrieri, Uber Cases Could Spur New Employee Classification, LAW360 
(May 6, 2016, 8:50 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/793584. 
 4. See VALERIO DE STEFANO, INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, THE RISE OF THE “JUST-IN-TIME 
WORKFORCE”:  ON-DEMAND WORK, CROWDWORK AND LABOUR PROTECTION IN THE “GIG-
ECONOMY” 19 (2016) (comparing different countries’ approaches to workers in 
intermediate categories and highlighting Italy’s system of extending labor 
protections beginning in 1973). 
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and broken apart.9  Workers are being managed by and through data, 
often through algorithms, and—even without a platform—many 
sectors are seeing the rise of the just-in-time workforce.10  Rather than 
create a special classification category only for the gig economy, any 
proposal for a new category would ideally be formulated to 
ameliorate conditions for other forms of precarious work and 
fissured workplaces. 
This Article proceeds by first providing a brief context on 
crowdwork and the gig economy.  Part II summarizes the current 
proposals for an intermediate category for the gig economy in the 
United States.  Part III describes the legal systems of Canada, Italy, 
and Spain, and their experiences with implementation of the third 
category.  Canada’s implementation was perhaps the most successful, 
focusing on expanding the coverage of laws aimed at “employees” to 
encompass vulnerable small businesses and tradespeople.  Italy, on 
the other hand, saw systemic arbitrage between the standard 
employment category and the intermediate category.  The result was 
confusion and the stripping of workers’ rights by misclassifying them 
downwards.  Spain revised its laws fairly recently, but because of 
burdensome requirements and a seventy-five percent dependency 
threshold to enter the third category, the category covered few 
Spanish workers. 
Informed by these experiences, Part IV provides a detailed analysis 
of the larger implications of the three national case studies for labor 
law.  These policy suggestions are guided by two overarching values:  
fairness for workers and safe harbors for platforms that are truly 
engaging in volunteerism-based work, community-organized business 
models, or only de minimis engagement with the paid labor force.  For 
the first value of worker protection, legislators, legal scholars, and 
commentators must be cognizant of how establishing a third category 
could result in increasing arbitrage between the categories.  In the 
Italian case, some workers actually lost protections as businesses took 
                                                          
 9. See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE:  WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO 
MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 94–95 (2014) (listing mechanisms used 
by employers to outsource and break apart work, including subcontracting and 
franchising); see also Judy Fudge, Fragmenting Work and Fragmenting Organizations:  The 
Contract of Employment and the Scope of Labour Regulation, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 609, 
616 (2006) (describing the impact of the changing organization of labor on 
employment relationships). 
 10. Cherry, supra note 1, at 596–97. 
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advantage of the legal confusion engendered by the creation of an 
intermediate category.11 
The default rule, we propose, should be employee status or 
something that, at the very least, resembles it closely.  Numerous on-
demand companies are already moving in this direction because they 
want the ability to control, train, and maintain a stable workforce—
hallmarks of the employment relationship.12  At the same time, we 
readily acknowledge that there are parts of the on-demand economy 
that are not about labor relations or potential exploitation of 
workers; rather, they are about communities, genuine sharing, and 
innovation.  Any reform to address labor issues for platforms should 
include safe harbors for people who are genuinely sharing in such a 
way that paid work is secondary or tertiary to their goals.  In our 
proposal, the threshold would be low, providing a way of separating 
one-off transactions or volunteerism from various forms of 
employment.  The balancing of these interests will further worker 
protection and coverage of those who are using platforms as an 
equivalent to professional employment, while exempting those who 
are using these platforms to create community. 
I. THE CONTEXT OF CROWDWORK 
A. The Scope of the On-Demand Economy 
Technology is increasingly changing the efficiencies and modalities 
of work.13  In an earlier article, one of the Authors referred to this 
                                                          
 11. DE STEFANO, supra note 4, at 19 (explaining how businesses used the legal 
confusion “as a cheap alternative to employment relationships”). 
 12. Greg Bensinger, Startups Scramble to Define “Employee,” WALL ST. J. (July 30, 
2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/startups-scramble-to-define-
employee-1438228860 (highlighting companies that have reclassified their 
contractors as employees). 
 13. This Section is a broad review of the legal landscape of the on-demand 
economy.  As much of it has been covered elsewhere, we will be correspondingly 
brief.  We have largely adapted this section from both of the Authors’ earlier work 
that described the particular features, structures, economics, and legal issues of the 
gig economy.  See generally Antonio Aloisi, Commoditized Workers:  Case Study Research on 
Labor Law Issues Arising from a Set of “On-Demand/Gig Economy” Platforms, 37 COMP. LAB. 
L. & POL’Y J. 653 (2016); Cherry, supra note 1.  For additional background 
information on the gig economy, see generally Valerio De Stefano, The Rise of the 
“Just-in-Time Workforce”:  On-Demand Work, Crowdwork, and Labor Protection in the “Gig-
Economy,” 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471 (2016); Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 
101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 87 (2016); Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the 
Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511 (2016); Brishen Rodgers, The Social Costs of 
Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85 (2015). 
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trend as “virtual work,”14 and it has also been described as “labor as a 
service,” “peer production,” “playbor,” or “crowdwork.”15  Some 
processes of “crowdwork” or “micro-labor” involve computer-based 
work that is performed wholly in cyberspace, where work is broken 
down into its smallest constituent parts—such as coding, describing, 
or tagging the thousands of items for sale on a website.16  Other types 
of crowdwork are aided by cellphone applications (“apps”) or 
websites.  They rely on technology to deploy workers to perform 
tasks—such as driving, grocery delivery, or home repair services—for 
requesters in the real world paying for these services, with the app or 
platform keeping a percentage of the exchange.17 
According to a recent survey conducted by Time Magazine, over 
fourteen million people currently work in the “gig,” “on-demand,” 
“platform,” or “sharing” economy.18  While these statistics have been 
                                                          
 14. Miriam A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 GA. L. REV. 951, 954 (2011) 
(using the term “virtual work” broadly not only to encompass virtual worlds but also 
to refer to work taking place online, including the type of micro-labor crowdwork 
performed on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk). 
 15. See TREBOR SCHOLZ & LAURA Y. LIU, SITUATED TECHNOLOGIES PAMPHLETS 7:  
FROM MOBILE PLAYGROUNDS TO SWEATSHOP CITY 22 (Omar Khan et al. eds., 2010), 
http://www.situatedtechnologies.net/files/ST7-MobilePlaygrounds_SweatshopCity 
.pdf; Derrick Harris, Why Labor as a Service Is as Cloudy as It Gets, GIGAOM (Aug. 22, 
2010, 9:00 AM), https://gigaom.com/2010/08/22/why-labor-as-a-service-is-as-cloudy-
as-it-gets (analogizing “labor as a service” to cloud computing); Julian Kücklich, 
Precarious Playbour:  Modders and the Digital Games Industry, FIBRECULTURE J. (Dec. 5, 
2005, 12:00 AM), http://five.fibreculturejournal.org/fcj-025-precarious-playbour-
modders-and-the-digital-games-industry (explaining the rise of “playbour” in the 
entertainment industry). 
 16. See, e.g., Debora Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses:  A Manifesto 
for User-Generated Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921, 929 (2009) (“Computer 
technology in the hands of the masses has made available software programs that can 
create music, documents, and art just as well as expensive studios did in the past.  
This democratization of technology disrupts the monopoly on the creative means of 
production.  The world of amateur production also demonstrates that many are 
motivated by noncommercial reasons.”); Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED 
(June 1, 2006, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2006/06/crowds (using the term 
“crowdsourcing” to describe work performed with the aid of contributions from 
diverse groups of users on the Internet); see also Irene Mandl, Working Conditions in 
Crowd Employment and ICT-Based Mobile Work, in THE DIGITAL ECONOMY AND THE SINGLE 
MARKET:  EMPLOYMENT PROSPECTS AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN EUROPE, 111, 115 
(Werner Wobbe et al. eds., 2016), http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/4200c007-f19f-
4aec-be49-1789d5804674/book-feps-hd-okpdf.pdf. 
 17. See De Stefano, supra note 13, at 471–72 (describing the types of work 
activities that use apps to facilitate business). 
 18. Katy Steinmetz, Exclusive:  See How Big the Gig Economy Really Is, TIME (Jan. 6, 
2016), http://time.com/4169532/sharing-economy-poll. 
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the subject of controversy,19 there can be no doubt that technology is 
re-shaping the future of work.  Examples include websites and apps 
that range from Amazon Mechanical Turk,20 Handy,21 Instacart,22 to 
Uber.23  These new companies’ labor practices have sparked intense 
litigation in the United States.24  Currently, the litigation is focusing 
on a common doctrinal issue:  whether the workers in the on-demand 
economy have the status of employees or independent contractors.25  
The question of employee status is particularly important because it is 
a threshold question to determine the rights and benefits owed in 
U.S. employment law.  Important substantive rights—including 
“minimum wage, protection from discrimination, unemployment 
insurance, [and] worker’s compensation,” to name a few—are only 
triggered for those workers who are deemed to be “employees.”26 
B. Legal Standards for Determining Worker Status 
Under U.S. law, whether a worker is an employee or independent 
contractor is determined through various multi-factored tests 
dependent on the facts of the relationship.27  The “control” test 
                                                          
 19. Cole Stangler, December Jobs Report:  How Many Gig Economy Workers Are There, 
Really?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2016, 7:33 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/december 
-jobs-report-how-many-gig-economy-workers-are-there-really-2255765 (describing 
prominent economists Alan Kreuger and Larry Mishel’s quibble with the numbers in 
the Time survey, and their argument that the numbers of on-demand economy 
workers are far lower); see also id. (highlighting consulting firm McKinsey & 
Company’s study finding that “less than one percent of the U.S. working-age 
population work in the gig economy”).  Interestingly, both economists have 
ideological reasons for minimizing the number of workers.  If the number of workers 
in the on-demand economy is small, it supports the argument that there is no need 
for regulation—a notion that Kreuger, who once consulted for Uber, could get 
behind.  The reason for Mishel’s minimization of the on-demand economy may have 
to do with the idea that labor unions should continue to appeal to their traditional 
base and ignore technological change.  Lawrence Mishel, Uber Is Not the Future of 
Work, ATLANTIC (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015 
/11/uber-is-not-the-future-of-work/415905.  Regardless of whose numbers we 
believe, or what conclusions we are to draw from them, the fact is that these estimates 
and analyses are subject to debate and controversy. 
 20. AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 21. HANDY, http://www.handy.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 22. INSTACART, https://www.instacart.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 23. UBER, https://www.uber.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 24. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 25. See, e.g., Cherry, supra note 1, at 581–82. 
 26. See id. at 578. 
 27. See Katharine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees:  Employment 
Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. 
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derives from case law and decisions on agency law, and focuses on a 
principal’s right to control the worker.28  Some of the factors for 
finding employee status are whether the employer may direct the way 
in which the work is performed, determine the hours involved, and 
provide the employee with direction.29  On the other hand, elements 
that lean toward independent contractor classification include high-
skilled work, workers providing their own equipment, workers setting 
their own schedules, and workers getting paid per project, not per 
hour.30  In an alternate test, courts examine the economic realities of 
the relationship to determine whether the worker is exhibiting 
entrepreneurial activity or whether the worker is financially 
dependent upon the employer.31  The label affixed to the 
relationship is a factor in the outcome, but it is certainly not 
dispositive.  In any event, the tests are notoriously malleable, difficult, 
and fact-dependent, even when dealing with what should be a fairly 
straightforward analysis.32 
                                                          
& LAB. L. 251, 257–58 (2006) (listing factors from the cases); see also Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326–27 (1992) (rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s test, 
describing it as circular and non-predictive, and discussing with approval the test that 
“turns on factual variables within an employer’s knowledge, thus permitting 
categorical judgments about the ‘employee’ status of claimants with similar job 
descriptions”); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728–29 (1947) 
(explaining that when workers complete tasks as though they are employees, the 
workers are protected as though they are employees even if the employer labels the 
workers independent contractors); Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 
F.2d 167, 170–71 (2d Cir. 1968) (discussing employee classification within the 
context of the respondeat superior doctrine). 
 28. See Stone, supra note 27, at 262, 280 (describing the “common law agency test”). 
 29. See, e.g., Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Serv., Inc., 161 F.3d 299, 
303 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 30. See, e.g., Richard R. Carlson, Variations on a Theme of Employment:  Labor Law 
Regulation of Alternative Worker Relations, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1996) (“Most 
labor and employment laws assume a paradigmatic relationship between an 
‘employer’ and ‘employee.’  The employer in this model contracts directly with an 
individual employee to perform an indefinite series or duration of tasks, subject to 
the employer’s actual or potential supervision over the employee’s method, manner, 
time and place of performance.  This model describes most workers well enough, but 
there has always been a large pool of workers in alternative relationships with 
recipients of services.  Some workers are ‘independent contractors’ who contract to 
perform specific tasks or achieve particular results, but who retain independence and 
self-management over their performance.”). 
 31. Stone, supra note 27, at 257–58. 
 32. Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One 
and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 298 (2001) 
(“Indeed, in the case of employee status, the law encourages ambiguity.  On the one 
hand, employers often crave the control they enjoy in a normal employment 
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C. The Uber Litigation and Settlement 
Many commentators hoped disputes over worker classification 
would end, or at least be shaped by, the wage and hour lawsuits 
within platform companies that have been pending in the Northern 
District of California.33  In the largest of these suits, O’Connor v. Uber 
Technologies, Inc.,34 over 400,000 drivers for the popular ridesharing 
service were certified as a class to seek employee status and redress 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)35 for minimum wages and 
overtime pay.36  In May 2016, however, O’Connor settled for a $100 
million payment to the workers and an agreement that workers would 
receive a hearing before an arbitrator prior to dismissal.37  While this 
was a brokered compromise, the settlement failed to bring about any 
definitive resolution to the classification problem.38  As of the present 
writing, the court rejected the settlement as inadequate, and the 
parties are continuing to negotiate.39 
Throughout the litigation, the judges struggled to characterize these 
working relationships within the “on/off” toggle of employee status.40  
                                                          
relationship.  On the other, the advantages (to employers) of employing workers 
who are plausibly not employees motivate a good deal of arbitrary and questionable 
‘non-employee’ classification.  It is not uncommon to find employees and putative 
contractors sitting side by side, performing the same work without any immediately 
visible distinguishing characteristics.  And the trend of the working world is toward 
greater complexity and variation, driven partly by the temptation to capitalize on the 
fog that obscures the essence of many working relationships.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 33. See Cherry, supra note 1, at 578. 
 34. No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 5138097, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015). 
 35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012). 
 36. O’Connor, 2015 WL 5138097, at *37. 
 37. Having the claims for dismissal heard by an arbitrator was an important 
aspect of the settlement.  Many Uber drivers complained that they were disconnected 
from the platform because of a complaint or because their customer ratings dropped 
below a certain threshold.  Many felt that these dismissals were arbitrary and 
particularly cruel because of their automated nature.  ALEX ROSENBLAT & LUKE STARK, 
UBER’S DRIVERS:  INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES AND CONTROL IN DYNAMIC WORK 12 
(2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2686227. 
 38. Miriam A. Cherry, Gig Economy:  Settlement Leaves Legal Issues Unsettled, LAW360 
(May 5, 2016, 10:26 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/791341/gig-economy-
settlements-leave-labor-issues-unsettled. 
 39. Jon Weinberg, Gig News:  Federal Judge Rejects Uber Settlement, ON LABOR (Sept. 8, 
2016), https://onlabor.org/2016/09/08/gig-news-federal-judge-rejects-uber-settlement. 
 40. Again, this has been a longstanding problem.  See, e.g., Alan Hyde, Employment 
Law After the Death of Employment, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 99, 101 (1998) (identifying 
new ways of working that challenge the current legal system, including new 
employment relationships, such as temporary workers placed by an agency and part-
time employees treated as contingent workers, and “ways of working that are not, 
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Regarding Uber, some of the factors in the control test point toward an 
employee relationship while others are reminiscent of an independent 
contractor relationship.41  On the one hand, crowdworkers—who can 
readily sign on and off their platform apps based on availability and 
desire to work—have more control over their own schedules than do 
traditional employees with set shifts or duty stations, such as a workplace 
desk or factory floor.42  Additionally, crowdworkers must provide their 
own tools, including cars, computer equipment, Internet access, and 
mobile phones.43  Further, end user license agreements (EULAs) label 
crowdworkers as “independent contractors” and force them to click “I 
agree” in order to proceed with work.44 
On the other hand, many factors lean toward an employment 
relationship.  Control may be high, given that companies like Uber 
use customer ratings to maintain almost a constant surveillance over 
workers.  Uber has essentially deputized its customers to manage the 
workforce and make detailed reports on how service is provided.45  In 
fact, many on-demand companies spend significant time and effort 
implementing quality control policies.46  With low-skilled and low-
paid crowdwork, the opportunity for entrepreneurship—and, with it, 
risk-and-reward—is barely, if at all, present.  Further, the terminology 
in a EULA is far from dispositive, as such online contracts are known 
to be extremely one-sided and are construed against the drafter.  
Although courts have yet to develop a clear formulation of which of, 
and to what extent, these factors are determinative, it is clear that the 
greatest possibility of exploitation falls on low-skilled workers who are 
most in need of FLSA protections. 
The above factors and resulting issues left the judges in the 
Northern District of California with a malleable test and an 
indeterminate legal outcome.47  With the uncertainty of the jury 
looming, both sides in Cotter v. Lyft48 and O’Connor would have taken a 
significant risk by proceeding with a trial.  Given the incentive 
structure of settlements and payments to plaintiffs’ class action 
attorneys, and the presence of arbitration clauses in the EULAs, 
                                                          
technically, ‘employment’ relations under any statute [such as] independent 
contractors, free-lancers, [and] consultants”). 
 41. Means & Seiner, supra note 13, at 1516–17; Rodgers, supra note 13, at 98–99. 
 42. Cherry, supra note 38. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 37, at 11–12. 
 46. Cherry, supra note 38. 
 47. Cotter v. Lyft, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081–82 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 48. 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
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perhaps settlement in these cases was inevitable.49  The drivers in 
O’Connor, however, stood only to recover small or nominal payments, 
which led the court to reject that version of the settlement.50  While 
we will have to wait and see what the parties and the court decide, 
what is certain is that the initial question of whether the workers are 
misclassified as independent contractors is left unresolved.  
Notwithstanding the settlement, a government agency (like the 
Internal Revenue Service), a worker’s compensation board, or an 
unemployment agency could determine that these workers are 
actually employees; in fact, some agencies already have.51 
II. RECENT PROPOSALS FOR A THIRD CATEGORY FOCUSED ON THE GIG 
ECONOMY 
As litigation over worker misclassification lawsuits continues in 
various U.S. jurisdictions, there have been corresponding calls to 
create a hybrid category situated between employee and independent 
contractor status.  If such a third category were to exist, proponents 
argue that the dilemmas surrounding proper worker classification 
would conveniently disappear.52  Having an intermediate category for 
gig workers would provide certainty and stability to businesses 
implementing a crowdsourcing model.  Proponents claim that the 
third category would have advantages for gig workers as well, who 
would at least receive some portion of the benefits that accrue to 
employees.  These proposals all seem to be focused on the gig 
economy and creating a special carve out.  Proponents cite 
innovation and the novelty of these forms of work and organization 
as a reason for special treatment.  The argument is that innovative 
business models cannot survive if overly regulated.53  Many of the calls 
                                                          
 49. On the role of arbitration clauses in the O’Connor v. Uber settlement, see 
Katherine V.W. Stone, The Uber Litigation Shows How the Company Gets Around 
Employment Laws, ALTERNET (May 24, 2016), http://www.alternet.org/labor/uber-
litigation-shows-how-company-gets-around-employment-laws. 
 50. See Weinberg, supra note 39. 
 51. Mike Isaac & Natasha Singer, California Says Uber Driver Is Employee, Not a 
Contractor, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/busine 
ss/uber-contests-california-labor-ruling-that-says-drivers-should-be-employees.html. 
 52. See SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, A PROPOSAL FOR MODERNIZING LABOR 
LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK:  THE “INDEPENDENT WORKER” 5 (2015), 
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_fi
rst_century_work_krueger_harris.pdf. 
 53. Note that this trope is certainly not limited to technology businesses in 
Silicon Valley or recent events in the gig economy.  Businesses for years have 
criticized regulations for stifling innovation. 
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for a third category originated in Silicon Valley; however, these 
proposals create a third category that, while called something 
different, virtually mirrors independent contractors.54 
Intuitively appealing, a third category would resolve many of the 
ongoing disputes over misclassification plaguing the on-demand 
sector.  Rather than litigate the issue of whether a particular worker 
or group of workers deserves employee status, gig workers would 
automatically be sorted into the hybrid “dependent contractor” 
category.55  This would eliminate the uncertainty that goes along with 
litigation connected to the “all or nothing” scheme and, at least, offer 
some labor protection to workers who “present only some 
characteristics of ‘employees’ but not others.”56  However, media 
stories and blog posts have debated the third category and its 
possibilities, and the conclusions are mixed.  For example, a news 
story in the Wall Street Journal discussed the advantages of creating a 
new third category.57  A writer for the Washington Post also discussed 
the possibility of a third category but ended critically, noting that gig 
workers were unlikely to receive the protection they needed through 
an intermediate category.  Likewise, in a series of blog posts debating 
the merits of creating a third category, Professor Benjamin Sachs has 
approached the concept with some skepticism.58 
                                                          
 54. “At a recent on-demand economy event, Simon Rothman, a venture capitalist 
and advisor to companies like Lyft and Taskrabbit, said, ‘I think it’s not 1099 versus 
W-2.  I think the right answer is a third class of worker.’”  Caroline Donovan, What a 
New Class of Worker Could Mean for the Future of Labor, BUZZFEED NEWS, (June 18, 2015, 
5:01 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/meet-the-new-worker-
same-as-the-old-worker. 
 55. See Guy Davidov et al., The Subjects of Labor Law:  “Employees” and Other Workers 
16 (Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 15-15, 
2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2561752 (describing the unsatisfactory pace of 
litigation that leads to legislatures considering adding a third group of workers). 
 56. Id. at 14. 
 57. See Lauren Weber, What if There Were a New Type of Worker?  Dependent 
Contractor, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2015, 10:28 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-
if-there-were-a-new-type-of-worker-dependent-contractor-1422405831 (highlighting 
benefits such as control over payment and wage rates and the ability to negotiate 
work contracts). 
 58. Benjamin Sachs, A New Category of Worker for the On-Demand Economy?, ON 
LABOR (June 22, 2015), https://onlabor.org/2015/06/22/a-new-category-of-worker-
for-the-on-demand-economy (arguing that a “dependence” test will not cover many 
of the workers that a third category is designed to protect); Benjamin Sachs, Do We 
Need an “Independent Worker” Category?, ON LABOR (Dec. 8, 2015), 
https://onlabor.org/2015/12/08/do-we-need-an-independent-worker-category 
(arguing that Uber drivers can be classified as employees under current law and that 
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Recently, two in-depth studies called for the creation of a third 
category.  The first was a report sponsored by the Hamilton Project, a 
subsidiary of the Brookings Institute.59  Written by former Deputy 
Secretary of Labor Seth Harris and Princeton economist Alan 
Krueger,60 the report advocates the creation of a hybrid category as a 
default for gig workers.61  The proposal terms this category 
“independent worker.”62  Under the report’s proposal, all gig 
economy workers would default into this “independent worker” 
status.63  Interestingly, while arguing that weak independent workers 
deserve better benefits and protections, the report asserts that 
neither the platforms nor the customers could be considered 
employers as they are in a triangular relationship with the 
independent workers.64  Paradoxically, this argument leads to the 
logical conclusion that there is no employer present whatsoever, a 
proposition that other authors have strongly disputed.65 
Under the Hamilton Project proposal, such “independent workers” 
would gain rights to organize and bargain collectively under the 
National Labor Relations Act66 and would also gain anti-
discrimination protections under Title VII.67  However, the proposal 
                                                          
the current legal framework is sufficient to deal with the “work time” issue by 
tracking a driver’s time spent driving to and transporting a customer). 
 59. HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 52. 
 60. Krueger carried out this study independently but has also previously co-
edited a study commissioned by Uber.  See JONATHON HALL & ALAN KRUEGER, AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR MARKET FOR UBER’S DRIVER-PARTNERS IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/uber-static/comms/PDF/Uber_Driver-Partners_ 
Hall_Kreuger_2015.pdf. 
 61. HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 52, at 5. 
 62. Id. at 2. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. at 9 (explaining that intermediaries create a platform or 
communication channel but do not assign customers to workers).  But see O’Connor 
v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1141–42 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (explaining that 
Uber does not only serve as a communication channel, nor does it “simply sell 
software; it sells rides” and “Uber simply would not be a viable business entity without 
its drivers”); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(explaining that Lyft “markets itself to customers as an on-demand ride service, and 
it actively seeks out those customers” and provides drivers with “detailed instruction 
on how to conduct themselves”). 
 65. See Jeremias Prassl & Martin Risak, Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co.:  Platforms as 
Employers?  Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 619, 
620, 646 (2016) (arguing for a flexible approach to defining an “employer” based on 
a functional analysis of a potential employer). 
 66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012). 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 52, at 17–18. 
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excludes payment for overtime and minimum wage arrangements 
because—at least according to Harris and Kreuger—the gig economy 
business model does not allow for tracing hours in a precise way or 
even attributing hours to a particular platform.68  Further, the 
Hamilton Project claims that an hours-based rate of pay does not 
make sense when dealing with work paid by the gig.69  Other 
commentators have criticized this stance for ignoring the role of big 
data in the on-demand economy.70  They argue that if anything, the 
gig economy enables constant tracking of workers’ data, allowing for 
far better calculations of time and work performed than any previous 
form of work ever could.71 
The second proposal, from business law professor Abbey Stemler, 
will appear in the Fordham Urban Law Journal.72  Titled “Betwixt and 
Between:  Regulating the Shared Economy,” Stemler advocates for 
the creation of new legislation to address multiple aspects of the on-
demand economy, including fraud, safety, and privacy.  In terms of 
labor rights, Stemler advocates for creating a hybrid category between 
employee and independent contractor.  As she puts it, 
Instead of classifying Uber drivers and other supply-side users in 
the sharing economy as either employees or independent 
contractors, regulators should create a new classification.  This new 
classification has been identified as “dependent contractors,” or for 
the purposes of this Article “microbusiness”—workers who fall 
between clear-cut employees and traditional independent 
contractors.  This new classification would enable regulators to 
think differently about how to fill regulatory gaps.73 
While a footnote references the Canadian experience with 
dependent contractors, it is only a passing reference.  The article 
does not devote any background or in-depth discussion to the 
historical or international origins of the category. 
                                                          
 68. HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 52, at 2. 
 69. Id. at 13. 
 70. Ross Eisenbrey & Lawrence Mishel, Uber Business Model Does Not Justify a New 
“Independent Worker” Category, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.epi.org/ 
publication/uber-business-model-does-not-justify-a-new-independent-worker-category 
(arguing that Harris and Krueger’s analysis was flawed because they ignore Uber’s 
data collection methodology). 
 71. Matthew Bodie et al., The Law and Policy of People Analytics, 49, 63 (Saint Louis 
Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 2016-6, 2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2769980. 
 72. Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between:  Regulating the Shared Economy, 43 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31 (2016). 
 73. Id. at 61–62. 
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On the political front, Senator Mark Warren of Virginia has 
recently begun discussing the need for legislation to address some of 
the issues surrounding gig-work.74  A recent message from his office 
noted that many younger Americans were finding themselves working 
at multiple gigs without benefits.75  This type of arrangement is 
reasonable when all goes well, but if there is a problem, many 
workers—who would be without health benefits, unemployment, or 
worker’s compensation—could find themselves without a safety net.  
As the statement continued, “While litigation is underway about 
whether on-demand workers are independent contractors or 
employees, this question is too important to leave to the courts alone.  
As policymakers, we should begin discussing whether our 20th-
century definitions work in a 21st-century economy.”76  In other 
words, regardless of how the doctrinal legal questions around worker 
misclassification are worked out within the court system, Senator 
Warren proposes that the problems of the gig economy might be 
better addressed through legislative action. 
III. A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
To date, the recent calls to establish a third category of “dependent 
contractor” have focused only on the present state of the gig 
economy.  Likewise, these calls have been centered almost wholly on 
the United States, where many popular crowdwork services were 
created.  Situating the “dependent contractor” category within a 
historical and global context, however, we note that other countries 
have already experimented with an intermediate category and have 
seen various and mixed results.  Granted, these legal reform efforts 
pre-dated the platform economy, but these approaches arose in 
response to a perceived lack of coverage by the binary switch of 
employee status.  In this Part, we compare the experiences of Canada, 
Italy, and Spain, respectively.  Our goal is to learn from context and 
experience, capitalizing on those elements of the third category that 
were successful and avoiding the aspects of those systems that worked 
poorly.  We begin with the Canadian experience. 
                                                          
 74. Mark Warner, Asking Tough Questions About the Gig Economy, MARK R. WARNER 
(June 19, 2015), http://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/newsclips?Cont 
entRecord_id=9ec95aab-a96c-4dd5-8532-b45667013d2e. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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A. The Canadian Experience:  Professor Harry Arthurs and “Dependent 
Contractors” 
Historically, Canadian law used the term “employee” as a gateway to 
coverage, employing the binary employee/independent contractor 
distinction.77  As most statutory definitions of “employee” in Canadian 
statutes were circular and unhelpful,78 the starting point for most analyses 
was the control test, which evolved under the principle of vicarious liability 
for torts.79  In 1947, the well-known case Montreal v. Montreal Locomotive 
Works80 supplemented the traditional control test used in Canada with a 
“fourfold” test analyzing “(1) control; (2) ownership of the tools; (3) 
chance of profit; [and] (4) risk of loss.”81  As one commentator has put it, 
these are “merely different ways of expressing the same ultimate question 
of ‘whose business is it?’”82 and they bear a similarity to the 
“entrepreneurial activities test” developed in the United States.83 
The doctrine around employee status took an interesting turn with 
the Canadian adoption of the concept of “dependent contractor.”  
The development of the category is largely due to the efforts of one 
law professor, Harry Arthurs.  Professor Arthurs, one of the leading 
academics of Canadian labor law, wrote about the problem of 
misclassification in a now-classic 1965 law review article.84  The third 
category was certainly not Arthurs’ invention out of whole cloth, 
however.  Indeed, he claimed to have come across the idea of 
                                                          
 77. Judy Fudge et al., Employee or Independent Contractor?  Charting the Legal 
Significance of the Distinction in Canada, 10 CANADIAN LAB. & EMP. L.J. 193, 193 (2003). 
 78. Id. at 209; see Ontario Labour Relations Act, S.O. 1995, c 1, sch. A, s. 1 (Can.) 
(defining employee as “includ[ing] a dependent contractor,” and defining 
dependent contractor as one whose working relationship “more closely resembl[es 
that] of an employee than that of an independent contractor”). 
 79. See 671122 Ontario Ltd. v. Sagaz Industries Canada Inc., [2001] 2 S.C.R. 983, 
999 (Can.) (discussing policy justifications for imposing vicarious liability in the case 
of an employee but not an independent contractor based on the control test). 
 80. [1947] 1 D.L.R. 161 (Can.). 
 81. Id. at 169. 
 82. See Brian A. Langille & Guy Davidov, Beyond Employees and Independent Contractors:  
A View from Canada, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 7, 21 (1999); Sagaz Industries Canada, Inc., 
[2001] 2 S.C.R. at 1001; see also Fudge et al., supra note 77, at 199 (noting that during the 
course of the twentieth century, Canadian courts stopped looking only at the issue of 
control and developed the more complex fourfold test). 
 83. Sagaz Industries Canada, Inc., [2001] 2 S.C.R. at 1001 (“It has been suggested 
that a fourfold test would in some cases be more appropriate, a complex involving 
(1) control; (2) ownership of the tools; (3) chance of profit; (4) risk of loss.  Control 
in itself is not always conclusive.”). 
 84. Harry W. Arthurs, The Dependent Contractor:  A Study of the Legal Problems of 
Countervailing Power, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 89, 89 (1965). 
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another category while studying Swedish labor law.85  Regardless of its 
provenance, Arthurs seized on the idea of a third category of 
“dependent contractors” as a reaction to a trend he was seeing 
increasingly in the labor markets that created injustice for certain 
groups of Canadian workers.86 
Professor Arthurs’ article noted that small tradespeople, artisans, 
plumbers, craftsmen, and the like were increasingly structuring 
themselves as separate business entities.87  Yet, despite setting up shop 
as separate companies, and thus falling outside the traditional purview 
of “employees,” these tradespeople had no other employees but the 
one worker-owner.88  Further, these tradespeople would work 
effectively full-time for one company that paid them a retainer for all 
of their services and time.89  As a matter of economic reality, Arthurs 
noted that these putative independent businesses were often almost 
wholly dependent on the patronage of the larger company.90  These 
ostensible business owners had little in the way of control and would 
often stand or fall on the continued business from the larger company. 
As such, Arthurs argued that the law did these small business 
people an injustice in ruling them outside of the bounds of the 
traditional labor relationship.91  In fact, he argued, such 
businesspeople were economically dependent upon a large company 
in virtually the same subordinate position as an employee.92  The two 
situations were so analogous, he argued, that employee-like 
protections should apply:  “Insofar as dependent contractors share a 
particular labour market with employees . . . they should be eligible 
for unionization.”93  Arthurs reasoned persuasively that these workers 
should truly be called “dependent contractors.”94  He then argued 
                                                          
 85. Id. at 89, n.1.  Arthurs relied on the work of Axel Adelcreutz, The Definition of 
an Employee 54, in THE LAW OF LABOUR RELATIONS IN SWEDEN (Folke Schmidt ed., 
1962).  In fact, the Swedish law is somewhat murkier as later noted by another 
author.  See Källström, supra note 5, at 164 (stating that a characteristic of Swedish 
law is the absence of “statutory categorization of employees”). 
 86. Arthurs, supra note 84, at 89. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. (listing occupations that have no other employers except the one worker-
owner, thus “personify[ing] the dependent contractor”). 
 89. See id. at 114. 
 90. See id. 
 91. Id. at 89. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 114. 
 94. Id. at 89. 
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that this group should be included within the definition of employees 
and that employee protections should be extended to them.95 
If devising a new application of the third category in Canada and 
highlighting the struggle of small tradespeople was all Professor 
Arthurs had done, that still would have been a worthwhile effort.  But 
the influence of his article spread far beyond academic circles.  As the 
court in Fownes Construction Co. v. Teamsters Local Union 21396 noted, 
Arthurs’ article truly “had an impact on the real world.”97  Arthurs’ 
influence was such that the concept of “dependent contractor” 
became established within Canadian Law during the 1970s.98  The 
effect was, in the words of subsequent commentators, “beneficial for a 
significant number of workers formerly excluded from the ambit of 
collective bargaining laws.”99  In effect, Arthurs’ academic work 
resulted in substantial law reform and an extension of employment 
laws to a previously subordinate group that had few protections.100  
Even a critic of the third category, who largely viewed it as 
superfluous, still credited Professor Arthurs with instigating a rapid 
process of legal change.101 
                                                          
 95. Id. (“They are often economically vulnerable as individuals because of the 
dominance of a monopoly buyer or seller of their goods or services, or because of 
disorganized market conditions.  If viewed as ‘independent contractors’ rather than 
‘employees’ they lack the legal status which is a prerequisite to the right to bargain 
collectively under labour relations legislation.  As businessmen, they cannot legally 
employ collective tactics to buy or sell or otherwise stabilize conditions because of the 
combines legislation.  They are prisoners of the régime of competition.”). 
 96. 1974 CarswellBC 641 (Can. B.C. Labour Relations Board) (WL). 
 97. Id. at para. 12. 
 98. See Langille & Davidov, supra note 82, at 25 (“During the 1970s, most Canadian 
jurisdictions adopted ‘dependent contractor’ provisions to include such workers within 
the definition of ‘employee’ for collective bargaining purposes.”); Michael Bendel, The 
Dependent Contractor:  An Unnecessary and Flawed Development in Canadian Labour Law, 32 
U. TORONTO L.J. 374, 376 (1982) (“Although the notion of the dependent contractor 
did not surface in Canada until 1965, concern for his status had become part of the 
conventional wisdom on labour relations by the early 1970s.  Between 1972 and 1977 
seven jurisdictions in Canada adopted legislation to grant dependent contractors 
employee status under their labour relations legislation.”). 
 99. Langille & Davidov, supra note 82, at 26. 
 100. PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS:  THE REPORT OF THE 
TASK FORCE ON LABOUR RELATIONS 30 n.19 (1969); COMM’R MAXWELL COHEN, REPORT 
OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON LABOUR LEGISLATION IN NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR 
243–46 (1972). 
 101. Bendel, supra note 98, at 378 (“[I]t seems safe to assume that all these 
amendments were inspired, in part at least, by the recommendations of Professor 
Arthurs and the task force to the effect that labour relations laws should be extended 
to persons who are not regarded as employees . . . but who shared the employees’ 
economic dependence on the persons for whom they worked.”). 
CHERRYALOISI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  6:35 PM 
654 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:635 
Over time the government “introduced this intermediate category 
into statutes in order to extend the reach of the statute beyond 
typical employees.”102  For example, the 1995 Ontario Labour 
Relations Act103 defined “employee” to include a “dependent 
contractor” and a dependent contractor to be 
a person, whether or not employed under a contract of 
employment, and whether or not furnishing tools, vehicles, 
equipment, machinery, material, or any other thing owned by the 
dependent contractor, who performs work or services for another 
person for compensation or reward on such terms and conditions 
that the dependent contractor is in a position of economic 
dependence upon, and under an obligation to perform duties for, 
that person more closely resembling the relationship of an 
employee than that of an independent contractor.104 
The gig economy in Canada has yet to achieve the same market 
saturation as it has in the United States, and, as a consequence, there 
has been little legal adjudication as of the date of this writing.  We 
might have expected Uber, as one of the more dominant gig 
economy companies, to have asserted itself as aggressively in Canada 
as it has in many U.S. cities.  But Uber is largely an urban 
phenomenon, and its growth in the larger Canadian cities seems to 
have been stymied by wrangling with municipal governments in 
Toronto, Calgary, and Edmonton over insurance and driver licensure 
requirements.105  Uber operates sporadically in Edmonton and 
Calgary because of its uncertain legal status.106  On May 4, 2016, the 
Toronto City Council ultimately voted to allow Uber to operate after 
a protracted series of negotiations and legal wrangling.107 
                                                          
 102. DAVID J. DOOREY, THE LAW OF WORK:  COMMON LAW AND THE REGULATION OF 
WORK 24 (2016). 
 103. Ontario Labour Relations Act, S.O. 1995, c 1, sch. A, s. 1 (Can.). 
 104. Id. 
 105. John Rieti, Toronto Uber Regulations May Match Those in Edmonton, Ottawa, CBC 
NEWS (Apr. 7, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/uber-
regulations-canada-1.3524429. 
 106. Id.  For an interesting viewpoint, see Jerry Dias, Letting Uber Break the Law 
Legalizes the Underground Economy, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2016, 4:52 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/jerry-dias/uber-canada-controversy_b_9252656.html 
(arguing that Uber must compete on the same level, with the same regulations, as 
existing taxicab companies). 
 107. The Canadian Press, Uber to Be Legal in Toronto After City Council Vote, 
HUFFINGTON POST CAN. (May 4, 2016, 1:49 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2016 
/05/04/uber-gets-green-light-from-city-council-to-operate-legally-in-
toronto_n_9840722.html.  For a flavor of some of the litigation over these issues, see 
Abdullah v. Naziri, 2016 CanLII 2168, para. 57 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (dismissing 
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The labor issues around platform work have yet to be heard by a 
Canadian court or adjudicative body.  As such, predictions are 
inherently uncertain.  But it does seem that the “dependent 
contractor” category, and accordingly expansive definition of 
“employee,” will make it more likely that gig economy workers will 
gain access to labor protections.  Analogous cases involving drivers of 
taxicabs, limousines, and cars for hire have largely resulted in 
findings of employee status.  For example, drivers working on a part-
time basis were held to be employees for purposes of the Canadian 
collective bargaining legislation and, as such, enjoyed the protective 
right to organize.108  Similar cases finding employee status for part-
time drivers in Canada have been decided in the context of minimum 
wage109 and workers’ compensation.110  Of course, each of these cases, 
like all cases dealing with employee status, looked very carefully at the 
individualized work arrangements of the drivers, their shifts, the 
dispatch policies, and other factors in order to determine whether 
these individuals were dependent contractors under Canadian law. 
One concern with finding Uber drivers and other gig workers to be 
“dependent contractors” is that the “dependent contractor” definitions 
in Canadian law focus on the concept of economic dependency on a 
single company.111  In an instance where a driver performed services 
for multiple online platforms or perhaps was only using gig work as a 
supplement to income from other employment, the definition might 
not provide coverage.  But as Uber and other companies have 
increasingly pushed workers into standard shifts that preclude the 
possibility of employment on other platforms, workers become more 
likely to fit within the definition of “dependent contractor.” 
Ultimately, in Canada the third category of “dependent contractor” 
has essentially resulted in an expansion of the definition of employee.  
The earlier tests had been too rigid and made it difficult for small 
                                                          
taxicab union’s motion for a preliminary injunction, given that the City Council 
would be taking action on the issue of the Uber driver’s licensure and insurance 
requirements); Edmonton (City) v. Uber Can., Inc., 2015 ABQB 214, para. 24–25 
(Can. Alta.) (finding that Uber Canada does not require a business license). 
 108. This comparison was drawn in Ontario Taxi Workers’ Union v. Hamilton Cab, 
2011 CanLII 7282, para. 35 (Can. O.N.L.R.B.):  “The single plate owner/lessee 
operators and the drivers are both economically dependent upon Hamilton Cab, 
notwithstanding the fact that neither receives compensation from it (other than the 
charge account fares paid by Hamilton Cab to the owner/lessee operators).” 
 109. Castegar Taxi (1988) Ltd. v. Director of Employment Standards, 1991 CanLII 
1088 (Can. B.C.S.C.). 
 110. Decision No. 934/98, 2000 ONWSIAT 3346, para. 6 (CanLII). 
 111. Ontario Labour Relations Act, S.O. 1995, c 1, sch. A, s. 1 (Can.). 
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business workers to claim benefits and protections.  The category was 
enacted to help those workers who were essentially working on their 
own in a position of economic dependency, thus requiring labor 
protections.  The expansive and inclusive protection of Canadian 
labor law may help legislators, law professors, and commentators as 
they evaluate current proposals for a third category in the on-demand 
economy in the United States. 
B. The Italian Case:  Unintended Consequences and Arbitrage of the 
Categories 
The Italian system of worker classification originated in the ancient 
Roman Law notion of “locatio operarum” (right to control the worker) 
and “locatio operis” (contract for a specific result).112  This dichotomy was 
translated into the two categories of independent contractor and 
employee (in Italian, “subordinate worker”) in the Civil Code of 1942,113 
with those categories still in force today.114  A fundamental binary divide 
applies:  only the employee is the subject of the labor laws, and most 
workers are considered employees.115  Article 2094 of the Civil Code 
(contract of service) covers employees but contains a vague definition:  
“a subordinate employee is a person who binds himself, for a 
remuneration, to cooperate in the enterprise by contributing his 
intellectual or manual work, in the employment and under the 
management of the [entrepreneur].”116  The provision allows for the 
implementation of a hierarchical structure, enabling the employer to 
organize work activities and to react to insubordination.  According to 
article 2104 of the Civil Code, the employee has to observe the 
entrepreneur’s directions while performing work tasks.117  As building 
                                                          
 112. The Roman distinction was between locatio conductio operarum, which refers to 
the classic master and servant contract and implies the right to control and 
encompasses respondeat superior, and locatio conductio operis, which was based on the 
production of a specific result.  See generally WILLIAM BURDIK, PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN 
LAW AND THEIR RELATIONS TO MODERN LAW 447, 450 (2d ed. 2004); Matthew Finkin, 
Introduction, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 1 (1999). 
 113. R.D. 16 marzo 1942, n.262, in G.U. 4 aprile 1942, n.79 (It.). 
 114. C.c. arts. 2094, 2222, translated in THE ITALIAN CIVIL CODE AND 
COMPLEMENTARY LEGISLATION 444, 474 (Susanna Beltramo ed., trans., 2012) 
[hereinafter ITALIAN CIVIL CODE] (giving statutory definitions for subordinate 
employee and independent labor contract). 
 115. STEFANO LIEBMAN, ILO NAT’L STUDIES, EMPLOYMENT SITUATIONS AND WORKERS’ 
PROTECTION, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---dialogue 
/documents/genericdocument/wcms_205366.pdf. 
 116. C.c. art. 2094, translated in ITALIAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 114, at 444. 
 117. C.c. art. 2104, translated in ITALIAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 114, at 446. 
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blocks of the employment relationship, the jurisprudence adopted the 
concept of “collaboration” or “co-working”—i.e., the prolonged 
availability or continuance of the relationship and technical and 
structural subordination of the employee—and “dependence,” a socio-
economic concept, to mean that the assets and tools of the business 
belong to the employer.  These elements are considered the “legal 
distinctive feature of both subordination and employment contract.”118 
The definition of “employee” under article 2094 of the Civil Code 
of 1942 has been widely criticized because of its vagueness.119  
According to Professor Lodovico Barassi, one of the great scholars of 
Italian labor law, the distinctive element of “contract of employment” 
(literally “contratto di lavoro”) concept was “eterodirezione,” which means 
managerial and disciplinary powers; for example, the ability of the 
employer (conductor operarum) to modify the content of the 
contractual relationship unilaterally.120  Managerial power is a 
hallmark of employee status because it allows for internal flexibility; 
i.e., the possibility of rearranging, even on a daily basis, an 
employee’s duties within the business.121 
Other scholars have since grappled with this concept.  Although 
the bedrock of eterodirezione came from Roman law—as a hierarchical 
description of the relationship122—the label was unable to describe 
comprehensively the complexity of the employee category and the 
idea of worker dignity.  Scholars realized that eterodirezione was an 
incomplete concept and thus developed other theories to explain the 
employment relationship.123  One line of thought developed the 
concept of socio-economic inferiority of the worker “who is 
                                                          
 118. Orsola Razzolini, The Need to Go Beyond the Contract:  “Economic” and “Bureaucratic” 
Dependence in Personal Work Relations, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 267, 270 (2010). 
 119. Michele Tiraboschi & Maurizio Del Conte, Employment Contract:  Disputes on 
Definition in the Changing Italian Labour Law, in 1 JILPT REPORT, THE MECHANISM FOR 
ESTABLISHING AND CHANGING TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT/THE SCOPE OF 
LABOR LAW AND THE NOTION OF EMPLOYEES 153 (2004), 
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/reports/documents/jilpt-reports/no1.pdf. 
 120. Razzolini, supra note 118, at 269–70. 
 121. Id. at 269.  Industrial relations at the time was conceived of as a way to further 
the interest of workers through socialist ideology.  Remarkably, Professor Barassi 
wanted to distinguish the socio-economic background of capitalist employment from 
the legal structure of the employment contract. 
 122. ADALBERTO PERULLI, ECONOMICALLY DEPENDENT/QUASI-SUBORDINATE 
(PARASUBORDINATE) EMPLOYMENT:  LEGAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 8, 30 (2002). 
 123. Razzolini, supra note 118, at 270. 
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considered—legally and socially—to be the weaker party in the 
contract,” but there was no precise threshold for this definition.124 
Besides the eterodirezione or managerial power factor,125 the case law 
developed a wide spectrum of subsidiary factors that could indicate the 
presence of an employment relationship.126  A judge could disregard the 
contractual label when the substance of the work relationship contained 
legal indicia of subordination—the so-called “primacy of facts” 
principle.127  The analysis includes a variety of factors:  (1) the 
requirement that the worker follow reasonable work rules, (2) the 
length of relationship, (3) the respect of set working hours, (4) salaried 
work, and (5) absence of risk of loss related to the production.128  The 
test is multifactorial, and no single factor is dispositive.129 
Turning to independent contractors, surprisingly, a definition does 
not exist in Italian law.  The self-employed worker contract is not a 
part of the chapter of the Civil Code devoted to labor.  Article 2222 of 
the Civil Code, which governs businesses, defines “contratto d’opera” 
(contract for service) as one carried out by a person who “binds 
himself to perform a piece of work or render a service for 
compensation, primarily by his own effort and without a relation of 
subordination with respect to the principal.”130 
Roughly speaking, general principles of civil and commercial law 
apply to the self-employed worker—including some particularities 
because human dignity is at stake—with the independent contractor 
                                                          
 124. Adalberto Perulli, Subordinate, Autonomous and Economically Dependent Work:  A 
Comparative Analysis of Selected European Countries, in THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP:  
A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW 137, 138 (Giuseppe Casale ed., 2011). 
 125. Cass., sez. Lavoro, 22 novembre 1999, n.12,926, Foro it. I 2000, 123, 1, 75 
(It.).  Moreover, in order to prove a subordinate relationship, this power should 
imply specific and well-defined directives rather than programmatic and vague 
instructions because the latter’s are also compatible with the independent 
contractor’s category.  Their compatibility with autonomous work are not sufficient 
for establishing an employment relationship. 
 126. Cass. sez. lav., 27 marzo 2000, n.3674 (“When an assessment of unambiguous 
elements such as the exercise of the managerial and disciplinary power is not enough 
to distinguish among employee and self-employed (being the presence of the two 
powers a safe index of subordination, while its absence is not an indisputable sign of 
autonomy) . . . .”). 
 127. Article 1362 of the Italian Civil Code provides that a contract must be 
interpreted with regard to the common intention and the behavior of the parties, 
and not merely to the literal meaning of its wording.  C.c. art. 1362, translated in 
ITALIAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 114, at 293. 
 128. Maurizio Del Conte, Lavoro autonomo e lavoro subordinato:  la volontà e gli indici 
di denotazione, in ORIENTAMENTI DELLA GIURISPRUDENZA DEL LAVORO 66 (1995). 
 129. Id. 
 130. C.c. art. 2222, translated in ITALIAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 114, at 474. 
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considered “as substantially and formally equal to the 
counterparty.”131  The statute operates by contrast, as it refers “a 
contrario” to article 2094 of the Civil Code:  independent work is 
performed without subordination.132  Moreover, an independent 
contractor relationship is supposed to eliminate economic 
subordination.  However, the concrete content of the job 
performance could be identical between an employee and an 
independent contractor.  The principle is that one could carry out 
“every kind of labour for which payment is calculated, whether 
intellectual or manual,” in either category.133  This confirms that, for 
the purposes of the distinction between an employee and an 
independent contractor, the core of the two definitions is the way in 
which tasks are accomplished and structured.134 
A leading case regarding misclassification by a courier service 
highlights these principles.135  Despite the label the courier service 
used to describe its workers in their contracts, the labor court ruled 
that the worker was actually an employee on the basis of 
socioeconomic dependence.136  The court reasoned that the delivery 
driver was part of the economic and business organization of the 
principal.137  An appellate court, however, subsequently deemed the 
worker to be an independent contractor.138  The highest judicial 
authority, Corte di Cassazione, agreed that the worker was an 
independent contractor.139  The courier case demonstrates that in 
labor cases, judges have considerable discretion to weigh the day-to-
day facts on a case-by-case basis, notwithstanding Italy’s civil law 
framework.  More recently, however, courts have given greater 
importance to the factual intentions of the parties, the so-called 
                                                          
 131. See Perulli, supra note 124, at 138. 
 132. Tiraboschi & Del Conte, supra note 119, at 154. 
 133. Id.; Cass., sez. Lavoro, 03 aprile 2000, n.4036. 
 134. Tiraboschi & Del Conte, supra note 119, at 154. 
 135. It is surprising how after decades and in a very different context, the jobs—i.e., 
driving and courier service—are so similar to what is offered in the gig economy today. 
 136. Pret. Milano, 20 giugno 1986, Foro it. V 1987, 110, 7/8, 2264 (It.). 
 137. Id. at 2264 (“The work, performed by the biker assigned to pick up and 
delivery and by using the own vehicle, has to be considered “subordinate,” in spite of 
the length, the possibility of refusing to execute the request for the performance and 
even in presence if of a monitoring activity (in radio contact).”). 
 138. Trib. Milano 10 ottobre 1987, in Riv. it. dir. lav., 1987, II, p. 688 (“The work, 
performed by the biker assigned to pick up and delivery and by using the own 
vehicle, has not to be considered ‘subordinate,’ in the absence of the critical 
requirement of continuity. Those workers are not required to appear everyday at the 
workplace and can refuse to execute the request for the performance.”). 
 139. Cass. 14 aprile 1989 n.5671 (mass.). 
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“nomen iuris” (i.e., contractual label), expressed at the signature of 
the contract.140  Subsequent elaboration made clear that workers 
could have a considerable amount of autonomy—granted by general 
and functional directives—yet still be classified as employees. 
1. The introduction of the legislation on “para-subordinazione” 
The Italian case is instructive for our purposes because in 1973, the 
legislature extended some protection to a tranche of self-employed 
workers, planting the seeds of what later would become the intermediate 
category of worker (literally “lavoratore parasubordinato” or “quasi-
subordinate”) situated between employee and independent contractor. 
Italian Law 533/1973141 sought to extend certain procedural 
protections to the weakest of the independent contractors and, perhaps 
incidentally, brought about the genesis of the third category, deemed 
lavoratore parasubordinato.142  Comprised of a subset of self-employed 
workers, these lavoratore parasubordinato were distinguished as workers 
“when the provision of the service presents itself as characterized, in 
practice, by a predominantly personal activity of continuous and 
coordinated collaboration.”143  Four “concurrent” factors need to be 
present to denote this intermediate category:  (1) collaboration, (2) 
continuity and length of the relationship, (3) functional coordination 
with the principal, and (4) a predominantly personal service.144  These 
                                                          
 140. This idea could seem inconsistent with the multifactorial test aimed at 
inferring the nature of the contract by analyzing the concrete ways in which the 
overall performance is accomplished, disregarding the wording of the contracts 
(“primacy of facts”).  See Cass. 29 maggio 1996 n.4948, DPL 1996, 3338. 
 141. Legge 11 agosto 1973, n.533, Disciplina delle controversie individuali di 
lavoro e delle controversie in materia di previdenza e di assistenza obbligatorie. 
(G.U. 13 settembre 1973, n.237). 
 142. MARK FREEDLAND & NICOLA KOUNTOURIS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
PERSONAL WORK RELATIONS 122 n.61 (2011) (“The emergence of the notion of 
parasubordinati in the Italian legal domain is traditionally linked to Law 533/1973, . . . 
which prescribed that the rules of procedure for labour litigation also apply to the 
‘relationship of agency, of commercial representation and other relations of 
collaboration materialising in a continuous and coordinated provision, 
predominantly personal, even if not of subordinate character.’”). 
 143. See NICOLA COUNTOURIS, THE CHANGING LAW OF THE EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONSHIP:  COMPARATIVE ANALYSES IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 72–73 (2011) (“In 
the context of parasubordinazione, the element collaboration differs from the one 
applying in the context of standard dependent work under Article 2094 of the Italian 
civil code and requires that a subordinated worker be one who commits himself to 
‘collaborate in the enterprise.’”). 
 144. This element is listed among the causes of this legal tool as the difference 
between managerial power (“eterodirezione”) and the notion of “coordination” seems 
too subtle. 
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quasi-subordinate workers were commonly called “co.co.co” as an 
abbreviation for “continuous and coordinated collaborators.”145 
The 1973 law did not, however, extend all the rights of employees 
to quasi-subordinate workers.  On the one hand, the protections 
included access to labor courts.146  The effect of such access, however, 
was limited and basically procedural as the quasi-subordinate workers 
were still considered outside the scope of the substantive labor law.  
Hiring a quasi-subordinate worker was much cheaper than hiring an 
employee because employees were entitled to substantive labor 
rights, annual leave, sick leave, maternity leave, other employee 
benefits, overtime, and job security against unfair dismissal.147  The 
1973 law did not grant quasi-subordinate workers any of these 
substantive protections. 
Nonetheless, the legislation was partly responsible for a relaxation 
of the rigid employee/independent contractor dichotomy.  
Remarkably, however, the 1973 law was not a reaction against 
disguised employment relationships; conversely, “it is something 
physiologically connected to certain kinds of economic organizations 
that the law has to recognize and regulate.”148 
The third category sparked undesirable effects within its first decade.  
Businesses increasingly began to hire workers under the lavoratore 
parasubordinato category.149  Most of these quasi-subordinate workers 
would all previously have been classified as employees.  Consequently, the 
lavoratore parasubordinato category was used to hide bona fide employment 
relationships in order to reduce costs and evade the protections workers 
were entitled to under article 2094 of the Civil Code. 
Over time, the result was employer arbitrage between the 
categories.150  As a consequence, workers saw a “gradual erosion of 
the protections afforded to employees through jobs that are 
traditionally deemed to constitute master-servant relationships in the 
strict sense[,] progressively entering the no man’s land of an 
                                                          
 145. COUNTOURIS, supra note 143, at 72. 
 146. Legge 11 agosto 1973, n.533. 
 147. Tiraboschi & Del Conte, supra note 119, at 156 (“[S]ome 90[%] of the two 
and a half million quasi-subordinate workers actually work for just one ‘client,’ and 
of these some 66% carry out their work on the client’s premises, often with working 
hours and conditions that are no different to those of company employees working 
alongside them.”). 
 148. Razzolini, supra note 118, at 296. 
 149. DE STEFANO, supra note 4, at 19. 
 150. Ministero del lavoro e delle politiche sociali, Libro Bianco sul mercato del 
lavoro in Italia, ottobre 2001, n.3. 
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inadequately defined notion.”151  This state of affairs persisted for two 
decades without intervention from the legislature.  Towards the end 
of the last century, the number of quasi-subordinate workers 
increased dramatically.152  They were seen as a “low-cost” alternative 
to stable employment relationships, especially because quasi-
subordinate workers are not afforded certain employment 
protections that full-time employees enjoy.153  In 1995 with the 
Pension Reform Act,154 the legislature did enact a modest 
intervention by granting self-employed workers social security 
contributions previously reserved for employees.155 
In 2003, the legislature amended the content of the quasi-
subordinate category with Legislative Decree No. 276/2003 (the so-
called Biagi Reform).156  To prevent the common practice of 
businesses incorrectly classifying employees as quasi-subordinate 
workers, the legislature required the collaboration between the 
business and employee be linked to at least one “project.”  Thus, a 
new definition emerged for quasi-subordinate workers:  “lavoro a 
progetto” (i.e., project work, also “co.co.pro”).157  The legislature 
intended the measure to verify the authenticity of the collaborations 
and protect against businesses disguising employees as quasi-
subordinate.158  Under the updated law, the “accomplishment of a 
specific project, programme or phase of production” was an 
indispensable element for checking the validity of a project work 
contract.159  These projects were required to be fixed term contracts 
with a definite end date.160  If there was not an actual project—i.e., 
the work was continuous and managed by the business—the worker 
could be reclassified into a standard employment contract and the 
business would be liable for back pay. 
                                                          
 151. LIEBMAN, supra note 115. 
 152. See Michele Tiraboschi, The Italian Labour Market After the Biagi Reform, 21 
INT’L. J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 149, 153 (2005), http://adapt.it/adapt-indice-a-
z/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Tiraboschi_Journal.pdf. 
 153. Ulrike Muehlberger & Silvia Pasqua, Workers on the Border Between Employment and 
Self-Employment 3 (Int’l Ctr. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11/2006, 2006). 
 154. Legge 8 agosto 1995, n.335, Riforma del sistema pensionistico obbligatorio e 
complementare. (GU n.190 del 16-8-1995 - Suppl. Ordinario n.101). 
 155. See Matteo Jessoula, A Risky Combination in Italy:  ‘Selective Flexibility’ and Defined 
Contributions Pensions, in LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY AND PENSION REFORMS:  FLEXIBLE 
TODAY, SECURE TOMORROW? 62, 83 (Karl Hinrichs & Matteo Jessoula eds., 2012). 
 156. D.L. n. 276/2003; see Tiraboschi, supra note 152, at 149. 
 157. See COUNTOURIS, supra note 143, at 77. 
 158. D.L. n. 276/2003; COUNTOURIS, supra note 143, at 77. 
 159. COUNTOURIS, supra note 143, at 77. 
 160. See id. 
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However, the lavoro a progetto reduced the role of the continuity 
and coordination elements of the original 1973 definition by 
discouraging long-term employment and also limiting the managerial 
influence over the quasi-subordinate worker.161  This modification 
was supposed to counter-balance the contractual power of the 
employer by defining in advance the details and conditions of the 
project.162  The central aim of Law 276/2003 was to reduce the 
number of precarious forms of employment leading to illicit work 
and evasion of social insurance contributions.163  In addition to 
requiring a linkage to a project, the legislature extended a series of 
social security benefits for maternity, sick leave, and worker’s 
compensation to quasi-subordinate workers.164  Professor Perulli 
theorized that the quasi-subordinate group was only a “zone,” rather 
than its own category or “tertium genus.”165  As a general policy 
evaluation, a Green Paper issued by the Commission of the European 
Communities in 2006 defined these reform efforts as “somewhat 
tentative and partial,” although they expressed the will of the Italian 
legislature “to tackle problems in this complex area.”166 
Although the centrality of the notion of the project was greeted as 
“the most innovative [and critical] element . . . in the legislative 
decrees implementing the Biagi law,” the law was not as successful as 
its proponents expected it would be.167  The Biagi law was criticized 
                                                          
 161. See generally Riccardo Del Punta, La scomparsa dei co.co.co., LAVOCE.INFO (June 
12, 2003), http://www.lavoce.info/archives/21781/la-scomparsa-dei-co-co-co. 
 162. See Tiraboschi & Del Conte, supra note 119, at 155–56. 
 163. Gabriele Piazza & Martin Myant, Italy’s Labour Market Reforms of 2012:  Did 
They Reduce Unemployment? 8 (Eur. Trade Union Inst. Working Paper, 2015.11, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715566. 
 164. D.L. n. 276/2003. 
 165. See INT’L FED’N OF ACTORS, TACKLING DEPENDENT AND BOGUS SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
IN THE LIVE PERFORMANCE AND MEDIA ENTERTAINMENT SECTORS 3 (2016), http://fia-
actors.com/fileadmin/user_upload/News/Documents/2016/January/FINAL-
Discussion-Note-Ljubljana.pdf; ADALBERTO PERULLI, COMM. ON EMP’T & SOC. AFFAIRS, 
STUDY ON ECONOMICALLY DEPENDENT WORK/PARASUBORDINATE (QUASI-SUBORDINATE) 
WORK 3, 5, 8 (2003), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/20030619/empl/stu 
dy_en.pdf. 
 166. Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper:  Modernising Labour 
Law to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century, at 12, COM (2006) 708 final (Nov. 22, 
2006) [hereinafter Modernising Labour Law], http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0708&from=EN. 
 167. Adalberto Perulli, Un Jobs Act per il lavoro autonomo:  verso una nuova disciplina 
della dipendenza economica?, (Ctr. for the Study of Eur. Labour Law “Massimo 
D’Antona,” Working Paper No. 235, 2015), http://csdle.lex.unict.it/Archive/WP/ 
WP%20CSDLE%20M%20DANTONA/WP%20CSDLE%20M%20DANTONA-IT/ 
20150114-124113_perulli_n235-2015it-pdf.pdf. 
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“for questionable techniques, the unsuitability of the selection 
requirements, deficient protective measures and the 
inappropriateness of the severe yet inefficient sanction system.”168  
Despite the legislature’s effort to safeguard the rights of quasi-
subordinate workers, their overall level of rights and protection 
remained lower than those granted to employees. 
In 2012, the Italian legislature passed Law No. 92/2012 (the so-
called Monti-Fornero Reform)169 to counteract the misuse of the 
“lavoro a progetto” definition by making employee status the default.170  
For quasi-subordinate workers, businesses could no longer exercise or 
interfere in the project worker’s autonomy; they could not exercise 
managerial power over the day-to-day work.171  Moreover, the Monti-
Fornero Reform stated that the project may not merely overlap with 
the employer’s core business or consist merely of executing low-skilled 
or routine duties.172  The law also granted a substantive set of rights to 
the quasi-subordinate workers by requiring compensation compliant 
with minimum compensation levels.173  The Monti-Fornero Reform 
affirmed that, in the absence of a project, the worker was to be 
considered an employee, backdated to the beginning of the 
relationship.  The intervention was one of several policies aimed at 
promoting “a general reshaping of labour protection [to] . . . 
counter[] the misuse of legal schemes already introduced in order to 
                                                          
 168. Perulli, supra note 124. 
 169. Legge 28 giugno 2012, n.92, G.U. July 3, 2012, n.153 (Disposizioni in materia 
di riforma del mercato del lavoro in una prospettiva di crescita). 
 170. During this time, project workers were estimated at 3.2% of the employed, a 
level that rose to 10.1% among the young, to 4.5% in the South, and to 3.8% among 
women.  Emiliano Mandrone et al., Is Decline in Employment the Outcome or Cause of 
Crisis in Italy? 3, 7 (Astril Working Paper No. 7/2014, 2014), 
http://www.astril.org/files/WP_7_2014_mandrone.pdf; see also Marco Biasi, The Effect 
of the Global Crisis on the Labor Market:  Report on Italy, 35 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 371, 
372–73, 381 (2014). 
 171. Michele Tiraboschi, Italian Labour Law After the So-Called Monti-Fornero Reform 
(Law No. 92/2012), 1 E-JOURNAL OF INT’L & COMP. LAB. STUD. 48, 61–62 (2012); 
Orsola Razzolini, La nuova disciplina delle collaborazioni organizzate dal committente. Prime 
considerazioni 18 (Ctr. for the Study of Eur. Labour Law “Massimo D’Antona,” 
Working Paper No. 266, 2015), http://csdle.lex.unict.it/Archive/WP/WP%20CSDL 
E%20M%20DANTONA/WP%20CSDLE%20M%20DANTONA-IT/20150921-09333 
1_razzolini_n266-2015itpdf.pdf. 
 172. Tiraboschi, supra note 171, at 62. 
 173. The law refers to levels set out by national collective bargaining agreements 
for parasubordinate workers or consistent with minimum wage due to employees as 
determined by collective agreements.  See id. at 63. 
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provide flexibility.”174  The Monti-Fornero Reform made it clear that 
using the quasi-subordinate category was disfavoured and discouraged.  
Not only did the cost of using workers in that category increase, the 
reform also created burdensome regulations and bureaucracy. 
Finally, the 2015 “Jobs Act”175 fundamentally eliminated the 
concept of project work that had its genesis in the 2003 Biagi law.176  
This change was intended to reduce the use of atypical contracts and 
to establish as the default the “employee” classification.  The trend of 
eliminating the project work concept has been part of long-lasting 
political action aimed at “moving as many employment contracts as 
possible, in a gradual manner over a period of time, from the 
uncertain grey area of atypical employment to the area of salaried 
employment.”177  The legislature implemented incentives, including 
funding of some employee benefits and liberalizing dismissal 
requirements, which made classifying a worker as an employee a 
more favoured option.178  While the quasi-subordinate category stills 
exists, it is now limited in its scope as well as its protections, further 
emphasizing the shift of workers into the employee category.179  
                                                          
 174. Valerio De Stefano, A Tale of Oversimplification and Deregulation:  The 
Mainstream Approach to Labour Market Segmentation and the Recent Responses to the Crisis 
in European Countries, 43 INDUS. L.J. 253, 264 (2014). 
 175. D.L. 15 giugno 2015, n.81, Disciplina organica dei contratti di lavoro e 
revisione della normativa in tema di mansioni, a norma dell'articolo 1, comma 7, 
della legge 10 dicembre 2014, n.183. (15G00095) (GU Serie Generale n.144 del 24-6-
2015 - Suppl. Ordinario n.34). 
 176. See Gavin Jones & Francesca Piscioneri, Italy’s Renzi Completes Labour Reform, 
Growth Needed for Jobs, REUTERS (Sept. 4, 2016, 12:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/italy-economy-reform-idUSL5N11A2IE20150904.  See generally Italy’s Jobs Act, 
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, Dec. 2014, http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowled 
ge/publications/124079/italys-jobs-act. 
 177. Michele Tiraboschi, The Italian Labour Market After the Biagi Reform, 21 INT’L. J. 
COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 149, 170 (2005), http://adapt.it/adapt-indice-a-z/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/Tiraboschi_Journal.pdf. 
 178. A monetary incentive was introduced that consisted of a reduction in the 
contribution burden per employee. The measure is provided to businesses that are 
willing to hire under a permanent contract of employment or transform other 
existent contracts into permanent ones. 
 179. After June 2015, a worker could still enter a co.co.co contract, but the 
legislature introduced this new notion of collaborations involving the 
accomplishment of work that is “mainly” (not “exclusively”) personal and organized 
in coordination with the principal.  The most recent Italian labor market reform 
could eventually provide a solution for the current disputes on how work in the gig 
economy could be regulated.  In fact, the scheme of collaborazioni organizzate dal 
committente could represent a useful template because it broadens the scope of the 
protections granted to standard employees.  See Antonio Aloisi, Il Lavoro “A Chiamata” e le 
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Essentially, the result is a return to the binary distinction of employee 
and independent contractor.  The legislature introduced a new 
notion of “collaborations organized by the principal,” offering 
scholars and courts a definition that raises many doubts as to 
framework, boundaries and practical effects.  The Jobs Act is still new 
and has not been fully implemented, so we will need to wait to 
determine what the impact will be for the classification question.180 
2. Policy lessons from the Italian experience with the quasi-subordinate 
category 
For the past two decades, the story of the quasi-subordinate category in 
Italy has been one of struggle, second-guessing, and revision.  After its 
promulgation, the third category became a discounted alternative to a 
standard employment contract.  Introducing a third category initially 
resulted in arbitrage of the classifications and an increase in precarious 
and non-standard work.  That remained the case, up until 2015, in spite of 
the gradual extension of protective measures through the reforms.  
Businesses used the quasi-subordinate category as a way to hide what 
should have been standard employees into a discounted status with fewer 
rights and benefits.  While the goal of the original legislation establishing 
and supporting the quasi-subordinate category was to extend labor 
protections and increase flexibility, those goals were never realized. 
Instead, in 2015, the Jobs Act changed course by implementing a 
strong presumption of employee status.  In light of the serious 
misuses of the quasi-subordinate category, the category itself has now 
been minimized and discouraged.181  Unfortunately, in the words of 
Professor Perulli, the history of the quasi-subordinate category is an 
“unfortunate series of legislative interventions.”182  The third category 
was not a panacea for the misclassification issue.  Instead, the changes 
created even more uncertainty for both businesses and workers. 
                                                          
Piattaforme Online Della “Collaborative Economy”:  Nozioni e tipi Legali in Cerca di Tutele/On-
Demand Work and Online Platforms in the Collaborative Economy, 2 LLI 2421 (2016). 
 180. Emanuele Dagnino & Pietro Manzella, Le Parole del Lavoro.  Il Lavoro Etero-
Organizzato:  Una Sfida per i Comparatisti, BOLLETTINO ADAPT (Apr. 18, 2016), 
http://www.bollettinoadapt.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Parole_Lavoro_PM_ 
ED_15_04.pdf; see also Jones & Piscioneri, supra note 176. 
 181. See Adalberto Perulli, Il lavoro autonomo, le collaborazioni coordinate e le 
prestazioni organizzate dal committente 3 (Ctr. for the Study of Eur. Labour Law 
“Massimo D’Antona,” Working Paper No. 272, 2015), http://csdle.lex.unict.it/Arch 
ive/WP/WP%20CSDLE%20M%20DANTONA/WP%20CSDLE%20M%20DANTON
A-IT/20151015-010522_perulli_n272-2015itpdf.pdf. 
 182. Perulli, supra note 124, at 167. 
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Turning to the gig economy itself, to date Italy has largely 
considered ridesharing services under the auspices of fair 
competition law.  In 2015, the Tribunale di Milano banned Uber from 
operating a service that resembled services provided by licensed and 
regulated taxis.183  Italian courts have yet to make a determination 
about the classification status of the drivers on ridesharing 
platforms.184  More comprehensive regulation may be coming as 
there was a proposal in March 2016 to regulate the sharing economy 
in Italy.185  This proposal, however, did not focus on the 
misclassification or labor issues.  At the EU level, there is a movement 
to harmonize legislation across Europe to become more attractive to 
digital platforms and new economy companies.186  Nevertheless, the 
EU is also concerned about these platforms disguising employment 
relationships.  As of the date of this Article, policymakers are just 
beginning to study and debate various reforms and proposals. 
C. An Economic Threshold for the Third Category:  The Spanish Case 
The Spanish Workers’ Act187 was passed in 1980, roughly ten years 
after Italy had engaged in major legislative reform.  This law, Estatuto 
de los Trabajadores, covers only employees, defined as “those 
individuals who voluntarily perform their duties, in exchange for 
compensation, within the limits of the organisation and under the 
directions of a natural or juridical person, referred to as employer or 
entrepreneur.”188  Spanish independent contractors were left to 
constitutional, civil, and commercial provisions of the law.189  Just like 
the Italian and Canadian examples, the Spanish law started with a 
                                                          
 183. Trib. Milano, 25 maggio 2015, Ordinanza nel procedimento cautelare iscritto 
al N.16612/2015; Trib. Milano, sez. spec. impresa, ord., 9 luglio 2015; see, e.g., Alessio 
Di Amato, Uber and the Sharing Economy, 2 ITALIAN L.J. 177, 177–80 (2016), 
http://www.theitalianlawjournal.it/data/uploads/italj-vol-02-no-01-2016/10-di-amato 
-177.pdf; Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Uber Ordered to Discontinue Pop Service in Italy, 
GUARDIAN (May 26, 2015, 1:38 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015 
/may/26/uber-pop-italy-order-discontinue-unfair-competition-taxi; Danilo Masoni, 
Italian Court Bans Unlicensed Taxi Services like Uber, REUTERS (May 26, 2015, 9:16 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-uber-idUSKBN0OB1FQ20150526. 
 184. Di Amato, supra note 183, at 178. 
 185. Atto Camera, Presentata il 27 gennaio 2016, n.3564, Jan. 27, 2016, n.3564 (It). 
 186. See generally Resolution on Action Towards a Digital Single Market, EUR. PARL. DOC. 
2015/2147(INI) (2016). 
 187. Estatuto de los Trabajadores (B.O.E. 1980, 8) (Spain) de 10 de marzo 1980, 
del, B.O.E. 1989. 
 188. Estatuto de los Trabajadores art. I.I (B.O.E. 1980, 8) (Spain) de 10 de marzo 
1980, del, B.O.E. 1989. 
 189. Constitucion Espanola 27 diciembre 1978 (cited as Art. 40 C.E.). 
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binary divide between independent contractor and employee status.  
The rest of this section will describe the Spanish system and the 2007 
reforms in more depth. 
The traditional binary classification between employees and 
independent contractors in Spain depended upon a determination of 
self-organization as an exercise of contractual autonomy.  Spanish 
case law has interpreted the definition of an employee to be a 
combination of two concurrent elements:  (1) the exercise of 
managerial power (“dirección”) and (2) how much autonomy the 
workers have.190  Spanish legal scholars have focused on the element 
of “alienness” (“ajenidad,” also defined as “ownership by another”) as 
a factor in determining whether an individual is an employee.191  
“Alienness” focuses on the allocation of risk and, consequently, the 
ownership of “the means of production and the financial benefits 
obtained by the company from the employee’s work.”192  As with 
other jurisdictions, such as Italy and the United States, the 
contractual label set by the parties is not dispositive.  Rather, a 
judicial assessment of the substance of the relationship (e.g., day-by-
day arrangements) is dispositive.193 
More recently, Spanish case law has paid more attention to the 
presence of a hierarchy and the organizational integration of the 
employee—i.e., the presence of directorial/managerial power.  Until 
a few years ago, labor courts interpreted the definition of employee 
expansively, using a default assumption of an employment 
relationship.194  To determine whether an individual is an employee, 
case law has analyzed the following concurrent elements:  (1) the 
level of integration within the organization; (2) the dependency 
upon one employer; (3) fixed working time; (4) provision of 
                                                          
 190. See generally Perulli, supra note 124, at 173–74. 
 191. See generally Ajenidad, ENCICLOPEDIA JURÍDICA, http://www.enciclopedia-
juridica.biz14.com/d/ajenidad/ajenidad.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 192. See Miguel Ramón Alarcón Caracuel, Dipendenza e alienità nella discussione 
spagnola sul contratto di lavoro, in LAVORO SUBORDINATO E DINTORNI:  COMPARAZIONI E 
PROSPETTIVE 296 (1989); Perulli, supra note 124, at 173–74. 
 193. S.T.S., Dic. 29, 1999 (R.J. 2000, p. 1427) (Spain). 
 194. See Por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley del Estatuto de los 
Trabajadores art. VIII.I (B.O.E. 1995, 1) (Spain) (“El contrato de trabajo . . . [s]e 
presumirá existente entre todo el que presta un servicio por cuenta y dentro del 
ámbito de organización y dirección de otro y el que lo recibe a cambio de una 
retribución a aquél.”). 
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professional tools and uniform; and (5) the extent of an employee’s 
decision-making power.195 
According to the government-funded research center EurWORK, in 
Spain and many other European countries the independent contractor 
category was used to hide bona fide employment relationships.196  
Hiding employees as independent contractors was especially prevalent 
in the building and construction sector of the economy.197  Both large 
and medium businesses in the construction industry resorted to 
subcontracting for tasks “that demanded relatively low levels of skills 
and qualification and were easily controllable.”198  Over time, the 
growth towards a “new generation” of self-employment (freelance 
consulting, for example) accelerated because recruiting self-employed 
workers was more convenient than hiring employees.  Self-employed 
workers were further desirable because businesses wanted to mobilize 
and de-mobilize their workforces rapidly to ensure a certain degree of 
flexibility and fluidity. 
These trends caused concern among Spanish labor groups and the 
government.  In 1995, Spanish social partners “Confederacion Sindacal 
de Consumes Obrera” (“CCOO”), “Union General de Trabajadores,” 
(“UGT”), and the Government jointly signed the Toledo Compact 
(“Pacto de Toledo”), criticizing the absence of legislation governing 
independent contractors.199  Five years later, the European Council of 
Lisbon (2000) envisioned a plan to shape a more competitive social 
Europe.200  Subsequently, in 2002, a trade union proposed the 
widening of rights for independent contractors who were 
economically dependent.201  The proposal was engendered by a trend 
of modernization as well as flexibility of the national industrial 
                                                          
 195. Miguel Rodríguez-Piñero, Contrato de trabajo y autonomía del trabajador, in 
TRABAJO SUBORDINADO Y TRABAJO AUTÓNOMO EN LA DELIMITACIÓN DE FRONTERAS DE 
DERECHO DEL TRABAJO:  ESTUDIOS EN HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR JOSÉ CABRERA BAZÁN 21, 21 
(Jesús Cruz Villalón ed., 1999); Martínez Barroso & María de los Reyes, Trabajo 
autónomo y trabajo subordinado.  Delimitación, análisis y propuestas de reforma, 273 
ESTUDIOS FINANCIEROS 71, 122 (2005). 
 196. See Antonio Corral & Esteban Villarejo, Spain:  Self-Employed Workers, 
EURWORK (Feb. 24, 2009), http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwor 
k/comparative-information/national-contributions/spain/spain-self-employed-
workers. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Carmen Parra, Aznar y los sindicatos sellan el pacto sobre pensiones, EL PAIS (Oct. 10, 
1996), http://elpais.com/diario/1996/10/10/economia/844898426_850215.html. 
 200. See Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000 Presidency Conclusion, 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (2000), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm. 
 201. Id. 
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relations that ended the era of the employee as “protagonist” of the 
social and political life of Spain.202 
In 2007, after consultations with non-governmental partners, the 
Spanish legislature enacted a new law, Estatuto del trabajo autónomo 
(“LETA,” or the Statute for Self-Employed Workers).203  LETA regulated 
all forms of self-employed or independent contractor-type work and 
covered all aspects of self-employment.204  This comprehensive scope is 
the most commonly recognized virtue of the Spanish legislative 
intervention towards an “experimental direction.”205  Self-employed 
workers are defined as individuals “not subject to the authority or 
organization of another person.”206  This comprehensive and systematic 
intervention was justified in light of the profound changes that the 
Spanish labor market was undergoing.207 
Workers who are part of this self-employed or independent 
contractor category are entitled to benefits in the case of termination 
(“prestación por cese de actividad”), maternity and paternity leave, 
temporary sickness (“prestación social por incapacidad temporal”), and 
beneficial social security programs for special groups (disabled, 
artisans or young entrepreneurs, inter alia).208  Moreover, self-
employed workers in dangerous industries can retire early (“jubilación 
anticipada”) without forfeiting social security benefits.209  Lastly, self-
employed workers can collectively organize and exercise collective 
rights, including the right to strike and to bargain collectively 
(“acuerdos de interés profesional”).210 
                                                          
 202. Antonio Ojeda Avilés, La “externalización” del derecho del trabajo, 128 REVISTA 
INTERNACIONAL DEL TRABAJO 51–72 (2009). 
 203. Jaime Cabeza Pereiro, The Status of Self-Employed Workers in Spain, 147 INT’L LAB. 
REV. 91, 91 (2008) (citing Estatuto del Trabajo autónomo (B.O.E. 2007, 20) (Spain)). 
 204. Spain was also the first country to systematically regulate self-employed 
relationships by drafting a “comprehensive and systematic legal framework covering 
all aspects of self-employment.”  See Corral & Villarejo, supra note 196.  See generally 
Pereiro, supra note 203, at 91–94. 
 205. See Pereiro, supra note 203, at 98. 
 206. Id. at 93 (referencing the Estatuto del Trabajo autónomo (B.O.E. 2007, 20) 
(Spain)). 
 207. What matters is that the worker does not employ any other workers in 
performing the services (Article 11, lett. a).  This interpretation seems to be correct 
in light of the law’s introduction that, in defining the scope of the economically 
dependent worker’s protection, refers to “empresarios sin asalariados” (entrepreneurs 
without employees). 
 208. Constitucion Espanola 27 diciembre 1978 (cited as Art. 16 C.E.). 
 209. Id. Art. 26(4) C.E. 
 210. See Pereiro, supra note 203, at 96–97. 
Law No. 11/1985 of 2 August 1985, Official Gazette, No. 189, dated 8 August 1985, 
pp. 25,119. 
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1. The creation of the TRADE 
Most interestingly for our analysis, LETA also crafted a third 
category of workers:  “Trabajador Autonomo Economicamente Dependiente” 
(TRADE or economic dependent self-employed worker).211  Because 
Spain has a civil legal system, workers needed to rely on legislation to 
claim their rights.  The legislature, in creating the TRADE category, 
was trying to ensure increased protections for a subset of 
independent contractors.  However, these workers did not receive the 
complete set of protections reserved to employees but “only 
protections specifically provided by LETA.” This intermediate 
category captures the Italian notion of legal dependency in the quasi-
subordinate or “lavoratori parasubordinati” category. 
TRADE workers enjoy some legal protections, such as minimum 
wage, annual leave, entitlements in case of wrongful termination, 
leave for family or health reasons, and collective bargaining.212  They 
are entitled to an annual vacation, a set number of days off per week, 
a limit on working hours, the right to be covered by insurance against 
work-related accidents and diseases, and protection for workers 
unemployed as a result of business failure.213  As a result, they enjoy a 
set of rights “beyond the statement of basic rights and duties of self-
employed workers—vaguely reminiscent of those of employees, albeit 
without equivalent guarantees or legal status [of employees].”214  The 
distinction between the employee and the TRADE categories lies in 
the notion of “alienness,” or ajenidad, described above.  While the 
employee does not own the means of production and the productive 
tools and infrastructure, the TRADE owns his or her tools and is 
equipped with all the hallmarks of genuine self-employment.215 
Interestingly, the category was not a reaction to disguised 
employment relationships but a way to offer a special legal 
arrangement for authentic self-employed workers.216  The legislative 
intervention represents a wider trend of expanding the class of 
individuals protected by labor law.  The trend is motivated by the 
desire to protect workers in the “grey area,” or at the margin of the 
self-employment category.  In particular, according to Professor Cruz 
                                                          
 211. Estatuto del Trabajador Autónomo (B.O.E. 2007, 20) (Spain). 
 212. Id. arts. 4, 8, 10, 16, 19. 
 213. Id.; see Pereiro, supra note 203, at 94, 98. 
 214. Pereiro, supra note 203, at 93. 
 215. See Perulli, supra note 167, at 12–13 (defining one hallmark of self-employment as 
control over materials necessary for activities separate from those of the client). 
 216. See, e.g., Pereiro, supra note 203, at 93–94 (explaining the intention to 
regulate and define parasubordination, or economic dependence). 
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Villalón, the focus on managerial power and the degree of 
organization was reduced progressively, to such an extent that self-
employment ended up being included within the employee 
category—namely, domestic work, teleworking, work in group.217  
The introduction of the TRADE classification essentially ended the 
traditional “binary divide.” 
The crucial component for determining whether a worker is a 
TRADE rests on a threshold of economic dependency measured, by 
law, at seventy-five percent.218  There are other criteria, framed as 
multifactorial tests, that inform the distinction between TRADE and 
other categories of workers.  Four factors help distinguish TRADE 
workers from employees:  (1) amount of independent work or 
reliance on the principal’s directives; (2) the worker undertakes an 
obligation of personal service, without using subcontractors; (3) the 
worker bears the entrepreneurial risk; and (4) actual ownership of 
the tools and instrumentalities of production.219  To distinguish 
TRADE from independent contractors or self-employed workers, 
three factors are instructive:  (1) a dependence on the principal for 
at least seventy-five percent of the worker’s income,220 (2) not hiring 
subcontractors, and (3) the performance of an economic or 
professional activity directly and predominantly vis-a ̀-vis one single 
principal.221  An implicit requirement of the TRADE category 
encompasses “continuity in the relationship”; hence, the 2007 LETA 
also regulates working hours, holidays, time and place of the duties 
rendered.222  In sum, the critical element of the TRADE test is the 
                                                          
 217. The “expansive trend” was slowed down first by removing some form of work 
from the employee category (in the case of goods transport workers who, in 1994, were 
excluded from the scope of labor law).  See Jesús Cruz Villalón, Il lavoro autonomo 
economicamente dipendente in Spagna, 2 DIRITTI LAVORI MERCATI 287, 291 (2013). 
 218. Estatuto del Trabajador Autónomo art. 11 (B.O.E. 2007, 20) (Spain). 
 219. Id. 
 220. See Modernising Labour Law, supra note 166, at 11 n.33 (stating that this 
requirement does not imply that “these workers are necessarily in a vulnerable 
position”).  Controversially, a TRADE could be at the same time an independent 
contractor.  See Juan Antonio Hernández Nieto, La desnaturalización del trabajador 
autónomo:  el autónomo dependiente, in ASPECTOS COLECTIVOS DE LAS RELACIONES 
LABORALES 177, 184–85 (2010). 
 221. Modernising Labour Law, supra note 166. 
 222. See Eduardo Rojo Torrecilla, El trabajador autónomo económicamente dependiente 
(TRADE) puede ser (temporalmente) empleador de un solo trabajador por cuenta ajena.  Una 
nota a la reforma de los artículos 11 y 16 de la Ley 20/2007 de 11 de julio por la Ley 31/2015 
de 9 de septiembre, EDUARDO ROJO BLOG (Sept. 14, 2015), 
http://www.eduardorojotorrecilla.es/2015/09/el-trabajador-autonomo-
economicamente.html. 
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percentage of income gained from work-related, economic, or 
professional activities from a single principal. 
There are numerous formal and procedural requirements to 
become classified as a TRADE worker.  In furtherance of contractual 
freedom, article 12 of LETA states that workers themselves must 
disclose their status as TRADE to the principal at the time of 
inception of the contract and “register” the position with the social 
administration agency.223  Furthermore, workers must disclose to the 
principal and the administrative agency any change in the workers’ 
situation that affects their status as TRADE (e.g., alteration of the 
percentage of the worker’s economic dependence) because the 
principal may need to verify information provided by the workers.224  
These strict requirements are burdensome and time-consuming for 
both workers and businesses.225 
A debate developed among scholars and judges about the legal 
effect of not following these procedural elements.  In 2011, the 
Tribunal Supremo resolved the debate by stating that the disclosure of 
the worker as TRADE is an “ad solemnitaten” requirement (i.e., 
mandatory),226 while the social security registration has an ad 
probationem” effect (i.e., permissive).227  The New Spanish Labour 
Procedure Act 36/2011228 affirmed that the TRADE contract must be 
formalized in order to be valid.229  Absent a written contract, the 
presumption is that a worker is an employee.  In 2015, a new reform 
granted the TRADE worker a number of additional safeguards, such 
as subcontracting for an annual period as a worker in the case of 
maternity or paternity leave, among other situations.230  The reform 
                                                          
 223. Estatuto del Trabajador Autónomo art. 12 (B.O.E. 2007, 20) (Spain). 
 224. Id. 
 225. See, e.g., Mark Freedland, Application of Labour and Employment Law Beyond the 
Contract of Employment, 146 INT’L LAB. REV. 3, 11 (2007) (explaining the complicated 
dynamics that encourage the greater security of standard employee relations). 
 226. S.T.S., June 12, 2012 (R.J., No. 8539, p. 26,566–67) (Spain). 
 227. S.T.S., June 11, 2011 (R.J., No. 6391, p. 17,820–26) (Spain). 
 228. Reguladora de la jurisdicción social, disposición final segunda (B.O.E. 2011, 
36) (Spain). 
 229. See Tiziano Treu, Le riforme del lavoro:  Spagna e Italia, DIRITTO DELLE RELAZIONI 
INDUSTRIALI No. 3/XXV (2015), http://www.bollettinoadapt.it/wp-content/uploads 
/2015/09/dri_3_2015_treu.pdf (noting the rigid establishment of the new economic 
dependent autonomous worker category). 
 230. Por la que se modifica y actualiza la normativa en materia de autoempleo y se 
adoptan medidas de fomento y promoción del trabajo autónomo y de la Economía 
Social art. 1.3 (B.O.E. 2015, 31) (Spain); see Torrecilla, supra note 222. 
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was intended to reconcile private and professional life by preventing 
such situations from causing the termination of the contract.231 
2. The low number of TRADE workers and developments on the EU level 
In Spain, few workers have actually become classified as TRADE 
due to the burdensome procedural requirements.  In 2014, 
according to Servicio Público de Empleo de TRADE,232 the population of 
self-employed workers was several million, while the number of 
TRADE was less than 16,000.233  This number is inconsistent with 
calculations made by Instituto Nacional de Estadística, who counted 
258,000 TRADE.234  Still, even if we use the higher number, that 
would still only account for “12.5% of the total number of self-
employed workers without employees.”235 
Meanwhile, Spanish labor unions complained that the TRADE 
category was inappropriately covering what should be traditional 
employment relationships.236  Conversely, employers’ associations 
were afraid of the opposite risk:  that the category would swallow up 
authentic self-employed workers, augmenting business costs.237 
Unfortunately, the European Commission had predicted an 
unsuccessful outcome of the TRADE category in a Green Paper:  
“while increasing certainty and transparency and ensuring a 
minimum level of protection of the self-employed, such requirements 
could, however, have the effect of limiting the scope of these 
contractual arrangements.”238  The legislature may need to revisit the 
content of this law because it offers protections too close to those of 
the typical employee. 
In terms of developments around the gig economy in Spain, a 
Barcelona judge has referred several questions about the on-demand 
economy to the European Court of Justice.  The European Court of 
                                                          
 231. Torrecilla, supra note 222. 
 232. Datos estadísticos de empleo:  Estadísticas desde mayo 2005, SERVICIO PÚBLICO DE 
EMPLEO ESTATAL, http://www.sepe.es/contenidos/que_es_el_sepe/estadisticas/datos 
_estadisticos/empleo/datos/estadisticas_nuevas.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 233. Teresa Alvarez Martín-Nieto, Caída de los Autónomos Económicamente 
Dependientes, CINCO DIAS (Feb. 10, 2015, 9:11 PM), http://cincodias.com/cincodias/ 
2015/02/09/autonomos/1423494891_645557.html. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See Villalón, supra note 217, at 295. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Modernising Labour Law, supra note 166, at 12. 
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Justice is expected to decide whether Uber is a taxi service or a digital 
service provider.239 
D. Summary and Assessment of the Outcomes in Canada, Spain, and Italy 
Having examined in detail the ways that the Canadian, Italian, and 
Spanish legal systems have established frameworks for dealing with 
the third category, we can develop some guidelines from these 
experiences.  Some of these lessons are directly applicable to the 
recent proposals for creating a third category for gig economy 
platform workers.  We have seen three different histories and three 
different outcomes, showing us mistakes as well as successes.  Spain 
provided an example of a legal system that adopted a third category 
only to see it limited to a small percentage of self-employed workers.  
The law assumes that TRADE workers are predominantly working for 
one business; this assumption could be a problem for platform 
workers who are working for multiple platforms.  The burdensome 
requirements to be met and the use of a strict economic threshold 
are the primary reasons that the law has seen only very limited use. 
From Italy’s various experiments with the third category, we saw an 
indecisive and almost mercurial modification of the third category in 
the years since its adoption.  Businesses used the Italian third 
category as a discounted alternative to what should have been a 
standard employment relationship.  In fact, companies used the 
presence of the third category of parasubordinato to evade regulations 
applicable to employees, such as social security contributions.  In 
essence, the quasi-subordinate category created a loophole that 
actually resulted in less protection for workers as an unintended 
consequence.  Through the years, lawmakers attempted to adjust the 
category in order to provide appropriate coverage.  Each successive 
action by the Italian legislature was an emergency intervention as a 
reaction to the misuse of the third category.  The end result was 
confusion. Since 2015, the third category is extremely limited and 
workers are presumed to be employees. 
There is a difference in the genesis, the content, and the effects of 
the intermediate category between Spain and Italy.240  Italy’s 
                                                          
 239. See Murad Ahmed, Judge Refers Spanish Uber Case to European Court of Justice, 
FIN. TIMES (July 20, 2015), http://on.ft.com/1DqlTdc (explaining that the decision 
could lift bans on Uber across Europe). 
 240. See Giuseppe Santoro Passarelli, El Trabajo Autónomo Económicamente 
Dependiente en Italia, 98 DOCUMENTACIÓN LABORAL 2, 10 (2013) (explaining that 
Spain’s understanding of economic dependence differed from Italy in that Italy’s 
focused on “coordinated and sustained collaborations”). 
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framework, enacted by the 1973 Reform, does not provide substantive 
protections.  Protections reserved to TRADE are much stronger than 
the ones reserved to lavoratori parasubordinati.  However, there are 
similarities in that the intermediate category was misused in both Spain 
and Italy.  In Italy, the intermediate category was used to disguise bona 
fide employment relationships.  In Spain, arbitrage of the categories 
shifted what should have been TRADE workers into independent 
contractor status because of the high level of legal protection and 
burdensome procedures associated with the TRADE category. 
As for Canada, the passage of legislation in the 1970s technically 
created a third category of “dependent contractors” through 
amending the definition of “employee” in various statutes.  The 
practical result of the “dependent contractor” category was to expand 
the definition of employee and to bring more workers under the 
ambit of labor law protection.  As a result, there was increased 
coverage and a provision for a safe harbor for workers in need of 
protections based on economic dependency.  The third category 
seems to have worked well in terms of expanding the coverage of the 
laws to an increasing number of workers. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF WORKER MISCLASSIFICATION IN THE GIG ECONOMY:  
SOLUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The implementations of the hybrid category in Canada, Italy, and 
Spain long predated the development of platform crowdwork.  Even 
before platforms and mobile apps, the binary test between employee 
classification and independent contractor left many workers in a no 
man’s land.  Those workers included delivery drivers, errand runners, 
odd job workers, and couriers, with several providing services that, in 
many respects, resemble the services provided by modern-day gig 
economy companies, such as TaskRabbit, Postmates, Grubhub, and 
Uber.  As such, these countries’ experiences with adopting the third 
category are useful in terms of evaluating what types of policies are 
successful and which have been problematic. 
At the outset, we should note that the debate over misclassification 
can be interpreted two different ways.  One way to view the issue is to 
acknowledge that there has been legitimate confusion about forms of 
gig work that do not fit easily into the binary distinctions currently 
recognized under U.S. law.  After all, gig-workers have some 
characteristics that are common to independent contractors and yet 
others that are reminiscent of employees.  In fact, the question of 
proper classification may be confusing even without the addition of 
technology; work can be structured in varying ways.  The problem, 
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under this view, lies with a legal test that is malleable, fact-intensive, 
and difficult to apply.  The other way to consider the misclassification 
issue is to acknowledge that there has long been arbitrage of the law, 
meaning illegitimate practices that lead to misclassification of what 
truly are employment relationships.  These practices hide 
employment relationships under the guise of false or bogus 
contractor situations.  Note that these two views of the 
misclassification problem are not mutually exclusive.  It is possible to 
have a poorly constructed multi-factorial test and, at the same time, to 
have businesses arbitraging the test to take advantage of the savings 
from classifying a worker as an independent contractor. 
Any legislative or judicial intervention on this issue must take 
account of both views.  One potential solution to the first problem 
might be establishing a third category to alleviate confusion over how 
to apply the test to gig workers.  However, if the consequences of 
establishing such a third category would be arbitrage and result in 
downgrading employees to intermediate status, that would do 
nothing to eliminate the problem of bogus contractor status.  In fact, 
adding a third category would only increase the amount of arbitrage.  
Three categories create more room for mischief than two, and we can 
see from the Italian case that such arbitrage became widespread in 
response to the adoption of the quasi-subordinate workers. 
A. Working Backwards to Determine Rights for the Third Category 
Another way to look at this problem is to work backwards and ask:  
Which of the rights and responsibilities that employees enjoy would 
not be appropriate for workers in the intermediate category?  As we 
saw from the Italian and Spanish cases, the kinds of rights and 
responsibilities that go along with the third category are just as 
important, if not more so, than the creation of the category itself.  
The rights available could be very few, mirroring independent 
contractor status, or, as in Spain, the rights could closely resemble 
those of employees.  Either way, there are serious risks to face.  
Construct the third category with too few rights, as in the Italian case, 
and it will run the risk of arbitrage, with businesses forcing genuine 
employees into the third category to try to lower costs.  But make the 
third category either too generous or too burdensome to opt into, as 
has been the case with the TRADE in Spain, and very few will bother 
using the category.  Continuing with this line of inquiry, the process 
of trying to work backwards to determine which rights these gig 
workers would have available and which they would not be entitled to 
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is far more complicated than it appears.  What rights and obligations 
would be left out of the hybrid category? 
As an example of engaging with this line of analysis, consider the 
Harris and Krueger proposal in which those workers falling into the 
independent worker category would not be guaranteed minimum 
wage.241  The reasoning behind the proposed exclusion, Harris and 
Krueger argue, is that in the gig economy, it is difficult to determine an 
hourly wage, and the hours may be impossible to trace across 
platforms.242  However, that argument shows a lack of understanding 
about the technology that is used for crowdwork.  Contrary to Harris 
and Krueger’s assertion, there is no lack of data or any difficulty tracing 
hours.  In fact, the platforms that enable matching workers with 
consumers who need their services also allow for the gathering of data 
about the work and the workers on a completely unprecedented scale. 
Indeed, most ridesharing apps feature real-time GPS tracking and 
updated ratings from customers, but those are just the features that 
are visible to users.  Both workers and customers generate additional 
data that platform companies collect and analyze, much of which is 
used to improve future performance.  Indeed, many platforms can 
measure precisely how much time and effort a worker spends on a 
task, down to the minutes spent waiting in traffic (in the case of a 
ridesharing app) or the number of keystrokes (in the case of 
crowdwork).  In fact, one of the major concerns with platform work is 
not difficulty tracing time, work, and hours, as Harris and Krueger 
posit, but rather the constant and pervasive surveillance through 
GPS, phone, and app data.243 
The idea of exempting gig workers from minimum wage 
requirements seems poorly thought-out.244  To date, many of the gig-
worker cases that have alleged worker misclassification have been FLSA 
claims.245  One of the most salient complaints that gig workers have 
brought forward is the lack of a living wage or decent pay.  As 
documented in one of the author’s previous articles, many crowdwork 
                                                          
 241. HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 52, at 13. 
 242. Id. at 20. 
 243. See Bodie et al., supra note 71, at 1–3 (describing the rise of people analytics and 
the use of big data at work, and expressing concerns for both user and worker privacy). 
 244. Miriam A. Cherry, Mindestlohn für Crowdarbeit? [A Minimum Wage for 
Crowdwork?], in CROWDWORK—ZURÜCK IN DIE ZUKUNFT?:  PERSPEKTIVEN DIGITALER 
ARBEIT [CROWDWORK—BACK TO THE FUTURE?:  PERSPECTIVES ON DIGITAL LABOR] 231–
40 (Christiane Benner ed., 2014). 
 245. Cherry, supra note 1, at 584–85 (cataloging the currently pending gig 
economy company cases). 
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platforms pay less than minimum wage, with some paying amounts that 
are on average less than half that of the federal minimum wage.246 
Meanwhile, there has been a widespread move by the “Fight for 
Fifteen” campaign to raise the minimum wage in the United States to 
fifteen dollars per hour.247  Statistics show that the current federally 
mandated minimum wage is low enough that a full-time minimum 
wage salary will not cover food and rent for a working family.248  If 
there is generally a movement to raise the federal minimum wage, 
why have a proposal concurrently to eliminate minimum wage 
completely for gig workers?  This is a rhetorical question, of course; 
but, as one of the authors has previously written, exempting certain 
work from minimum wage would only exacerbate the problem of 
exploitation of workers in the gig economy.249 
If retracting the minimum wage for the gig economy seems 
problematic, what about excluding other rights from the gig worker 
hybrid category?  Would we choose to exempt platforms from 
generally applicable laws that prohibit employers from making 
employment decisions based on prohibited factors such as race, sex, 
age, and disability?250  On platforms, especially those involving purely 
digital labor, individual workers are often faceless and nameless.  But 
that too may be a flawed assumption as even a screen name or a 
picture of dark skin—or even an avatar with darker skin—might 
result in employment discrimination.  In reality, provision of services 
through platforms has the potential to be biased based on customer 
prejudice.  Researchers have begun to document the biases 
embedded in the review and rating systems that many platforms 
                                                          
 246. Miriam A. Cherry, Working for (Virtually) Minimum Wage, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1077, 
1078, 1093–94 (2009). 
 247. See Katrina vanden Heuvel, How a $15 Minimum Wage Went from “Extreme” to 
Enacted, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how 
-a-15-minimum-wage-went-from-extreme-to-enacted/2016/04/05/6cf53d20-fa9f-11e5 
-80e4-c381214de1a3_story.html?utm_term=.839aa4cdf6e9 (estimating that eighteen 
percent of the workforce will be on their way to $15 an hour after New York and 
California pass their minimum wage laws). 
 248. See HEATHER BOUSHEY ET AL., ECON. POLICY INST., HARDSHIPS IN AMERICA:  THE 
REAL STORY OF WORKING FAMILIES 3–4, 44, 48 (2001) (finding that working full-time 
does not isolate families from hardship); BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED:  
ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA 61 (2001) (describing the author’s experiment with 
minimum wage jobs). 
 249. See Cherry, supra note 1, at 586–87 (arguing against an exemption for 
minimum wage); see also Cherry, supra note 244. 
 250. For a general overview of the scope of anti-discrimination laws, see Marcia L. 
McCormick, The Truth Is out There:  Revamping Federal Anti-Discrimination Enforcement 
for the Twenty-First Century, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP’T & LAB. L. 193, 193–231 (2009). 
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use.251  There is a great deal of jurisprudence under Title VII holding 
that so-called “customer preference” for workers of a certain race or 
gender is not an excuse for employment discrimination.252  The fact 
that customer ratings are now embedded in online platforms, and in 
fact may sometimes be the only factor used to terminate a worker’s 
access to the app, is troubling.253 
What about excluding other protections from the category?  
Should gig workers have the ability to report crimes that they notice 
on the job to law enforcement without retaliation?  If a gig worker is 
injured while carrying out an assignment obtained from a platform, 
should the worker have the right to collect worker’s compensation, or 
is redress for the tort system?  Ultimately, the “working backwards” 
plan to determine which of the rights allocated by labor and 
employment law are expendable for gig workers is a losing 
proposition.  Determining which rights to eliminate is an impossible 
dilemma, especially when those granted to employees in the United 
States are meager compared to those guaranteed to workers in many 
industrialized nations.254  Each of these laws or sets of laws was passed 
in order to give workers basic protections that they could not achieve 
on their own due to the imbalance of power between workers and 
employers.  Cutting protections only for the sake of creating a 
discounted category seems not only artificial, but bears no rational 
relationship to the realities of gig work or the technology that is 
being used on platforms themselves. 
B. Practical Difficulties with Implementation of a Third Category 
Apart from difficulties in defining the third category and the 
protections or exclusions it would contain, we also feel that it is 
important to note that, solely on a practical level, it might be difficult 
to create a third category exclusively for gig workers in the United 
                                                          
 251. See Aaron Belzer & Nancy Leong, The New Public Accommodations, 105 GEO. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 30–32), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.c 
fm?abstract_id=2687486 (predicting that platform users of minority races will receive 
worse service until they are eventually denied altogether); Rosenblat & Stark, supra 
note 37, at 14 (suggesting a new study on bias in ratings analyzing heterosexual white 
men compared to minority populations). 
 252. See, e.g., Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 297, 299, 302, 304 (N.D. 
Tex. 1981). 
 253. See Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 37, at 12 (stating that drivers need to 
maintain, on average, a 4.6/5 stars or above to remain active on Uber, and they 
cannot remove a rating even if it is given to them unfairly). 
 254. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MIRIAM CHERRY, GLOBAL ISSUES IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 
170–86 (Samuel Estreicher & Miriam Cherry eds., 2008). 
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States.  Proponents have made it seem like creating the third category 
will be natural or easy.255  But it would actually be a complex 
legislative intervention, largely in part because there would have to be 
hard decisions, as mentioned above, about which rights and 
responsibilities to include and exclude from the categories.  
Additionally, determining where a worker would fit within the three 
categories would have its own doctrinal elements and the potential 
for misclassification, arbitrage, and confusion. 
It is possible that judges and administrative bodies could, on their 
own authority, shift their interpretation of the statutes so as to carve 
out or constitute an intermediate category.  But this is unlikely, given 
the way that the statutes are written.  Adding a third classification 
when the statutes only call for two categories would constitute a vast 
feat of judicial activism.  It would also be seen as the kind of process 
that would likely require political debate and discussion associated 
more with legislation than with judicial decision making. In light of 
the political decisions and consequences that surround the issue of 
the third category, judges would likely demur from creating a new 
category without guidance from the legislature. 
The ridesharing cases provide an illustrative example.  In Cotter v. Lyft, 
Judge Vince Chhabria famously stated that the case was like being 
“handed a square peg and asked to choose between two round holes.”256  
Yet, even acknowledging that the gig workers were not a particularly 
good fit for either employee or independent contractor status, Judge 
Chhabria turned the case over to the jury and is now presiding over the 
settlement agreement.  Therefore, even though some judges recognize 
that the on/off switch between independent contractor and employee is 
an imperfect fit for the realities of work today, they have not dared to 
create another category on their own initiative. 
Creating a third category in the United States for gig workers 
would most likely require legislative action.  It is true that legislation 
has lagged woefully behind technological developments.257  However, 
there has recently been some legislation that directly responded to 
                                                          
 255. Seth Harris was quoted as stating that “[a]fter we produced the paper, we 
joked that we succeeded in making everybody mad by coming up with the right 
answer.” Guerrieri, supra note 3. 
 256. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 257. David Mercer, Technology and the Law:  Dealing with the “Law Lag,” AUSTRALIAN 
(July 4, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/archive/business/techn 
ology-and-the-law-dealing-with-the-law-lag/story-fn8ex0p1-1226086951328 
(explaining how new advances in science and technology demand the knowledge 
necessary to properly apply appropriate legal principles and consideration of the 
contexts in which they arise). 
CHERRYALOISI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  6:35 PM 
682 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:635 
recent technological developments, such as the JOBS Act258 for 
online crowdfunding.259  There has also been legislation that ended 
or otherwise cracked down on the use of technology; for instance, 
online prediction markets that allowed participants to engage in 
forecasting about future political, economic, or social events were 
unwittingly outlawed by the Unlawful Internet Gambling Act of 
2006.260  Legislative change can be slow, unwieldy, and difficult to 
predict.  There are also changes that would need to happen in state 
legislatures, as many states have statutes that similarly only apply to 
employees.  Ultimately, the possibility of political change is uncertain, 
and the intervention is far from a panacea. 
C. Shifting Towards a Default Presumption of Employee Status 
One way to govern the difficult classification issues that have arisen 
is to make changes regarding the default presumptions around 
employee and independent contractor status.  Because it will be 
difficult to implement a third category and there is, as of yet, little or 
no consensus on how to constitute the category or how it might meet 
the needs of platforms and gig workers, a third category may not be 
feasible.  To address current misclassification issues, one solution 
might be to change the default presumptions regarding the two 
categories that already exist.  Currently, many platform companies 
operate in an environment where the triangular relationship between 
the platform, customer, and worker obscures the role of the platform 
as employer.261  If a company deems workers to be independent 
contractors, it is left up to the workers, or perhaps to government 
agencies (like the Social Security Administration or the Internal 
Revenue Service), to contest that status as misclassification.  Such a 
default actually encourages misclassification as there is the potential 
that no one will want to invest the time, patience, and effort in 
starting an administrative action or lawsuit to challenge the firm’s 
                                                          
 258. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). 
 259. See Joan MacLeod Hemmingway, What Is a Security in the Crowdfunding Era?, 7 
OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 335, 336, 340–41, 357 (2012) (focusing on 
Congress’s move for capital formation for small businesses). 
 260. See Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, First Amendment and Prediction 
Markets, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 833–37 (2008) (explaining how legislation can 
damage predictive speech). 
 261. See Jeremias Prassl & Martin Risak, Uber, TaskRabbit, and Co.:  Platforms as 
Employers?  Rethinking the Legal Anaysis of Crowdwork, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 619, 
634 (2016) (stating that crowdwork “challenges the very existence of a contract of 
employment, leaving individual workers without recourse to the majority of domestic 
employment protective legislation”). 
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initial misclassification.  It is true that misclassification can result in 
costly legal challenges and in some instances lead to penalties, but 
many companies are willing to take that risk.  In other words, 
companies feel it is better to risk asking for forgiveness rather than 
first getting permission.262  Meanwhile, workers face high transaction 
costs in trying to get the work re-classified:  the time and expense of 
becoming involved in a lawsuit.  As the jobs involved often encompass 
low-paid casual work, the effort may not be worthwhile. 
 Instead of the current system in which the firm chooses how to 
classify workers and then later justifies its position in litigation, we 
should consider working with a different presumption.  Assume that 
above a minimum threshold of hours worked, the default 
classification would be an employment relationship.  That would be 
the case even if the work was on a platform or completely took place 
in cyberspace.  It would be an employment relationship even if the 
arrangement were flexible, even if the worker provided his or her 
own tools of the trade, and even if it were considered part-time 
employment.  There would then be opt-outs for those who are truly 
independent businesses and genuinely self-employed.  However, such 
an opt-out could not be a condition of work on a platform.  
Currently, such coerced choice is stuck into online EULAs, which are 
little more than adhesion contracts.  In these EULAs, workers have 
no other choice but a “take it or leave it” bargain with an online form 
that many users have not even read. 
There are some on-demand economy companies that have already, 
on their own initiative, engaged in shifting their workers to be 
employee status.  HomeHero is a mobile platform that provides 
home health care and elder care.  It recently shifted from an 
independent contractor to an employee based model.  The 
company’s CEO claimed that it did so “[i]n order to ensure a 
consistent experience as we scale nationwide.”263  In the words of the 
CEO of Shyp, a package delivery service that also moved from 
independent contractors to an employee model, the company’s 
                                                          
 262. Indeed, this seems to be a key lynchpin of Uber’s regulatory and compliance 
strategy:  do business first, and ask questions later.  See, e.g., Becki Smith, Uber’s Labor 
Relations Is Driving It into a Ditch, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 2, 2016, 2:57 PM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/ubers-labor-relations-driving-it-ditch-422285 
(highlighting the ways in which Uber ignores regulations and fights against worker 
accountability so they can “litigate, litigate, litigate” later). 
 263. Annlee Ellingson, Why HomeHero Is Converting All of Its Independent Contractors 
to W-2 Employees, L.A. BIZ (Mar. 1, 2016, 12:07 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/losa 
ngeles/news/2016/03/01/why-homehero-is-converting-all-of-its-independent.html 
(quoting Kyle Hill, CEO of HomeHero). 
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“investment in a longer-term relationship with our couriers” would 
“ultimately create the best experience for our customers.”264 
Other platform companies have classified their workers as 
employees from their inception.  Examples of these companies 
include Hello Alfred; Managed by Q; Munchery; the transit service, 
Bridj; and the temporary agency, BlueCrew.265  The CEO of Hello 
Alfred noted a commitment between the company and the workers 
who want more than a gig; these workers want a career path.266  
Because many of the platform businesses are based on people serving 
other people who are often repeat customers rather than one-off 
transactions, providing appropriate training and career advancement 
to workers makes business sense.  Some platform companies have 
provided benefits, including health insurance.267  Their hope is to 
stand out from other platforms and attract the most talented workers. 
These experiences demonstrate that the platform economy can still 
exist when workers are provided with the rights afforded to 
employees.  The concerns that burdensome regulations will drive 
platforms out of business seem to be overblown, much like earlier 
arguments that regulation—of minimum wage, maximum hours, 
child labor, and safety—would end various phases or components of 
the industrial revolution.  To address current misclassification issues, 
we come back to the thought that perhaps the best answer is not to 
create a third category with an as yet to be determined set of rights 
but instead to change the default presumptions vis-a-vis the two pre-
existing categories.  But businesses need certainty, and the safe 
harbor that we discuss below would surely be helpful when navigating 
the uncertain question of classification. 
                                                          
 264. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, EMPLOYERS IN THE ON-DEMAND ECONOMY:  WHY 
TREATING WORKERS AS EMPLOYEES IS GOOD FOR BUSINESS 2 (2016), 
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Fact-Sheet-Employers-in-the-On-Demand-
Economy.pdf (quoting Kevin Gibbon, CEO of Shyp). 
 265. Smith, supra note 262. 
 266. See Oscar Perry Abello, This “Gig Economy” Firm Prefers to Have Employees, Not 
Contractors, NEXT CITY (Aug. 5, 2015), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/sharing-
economy-jobs-employees-not-contractors (“We believe treating our employees as our 
primary customer is how we can best satisfy our end users.  It can become difficult to 
achieve this with the 1099 classification, because it inherently distances the worker 
from the company.  There is no onus to provide meaningful work, training, or career 
advancement.” (quoting Marcela Sapone, CEO of Hello Alfred)). 
 267. Cole Stangler, Meet the Gig Economy Companies that See Investing in Workers as a 
Smart Business Strategy, IB TIMES (Mar. 15, 2016, 11:24 AM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/meet-gig-economy-companies-see-investing-workers-smart-
business-strategy-2336721 (using Managed by Q as an example of a company offering 
health insurance to gig workers). 
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D. Safe Harbor for Volunteerism and Alternative Business Models 
Many supporters and lobbyists for Uber or other platform-based 
companies have suggested that these businesses deserve room to 
maneuver with special rules that amount to a moratorium on existing 
labor regulations because they are new, interesting, and will create 
more jobs in the future.  What would be the justification for granting 
platform economy companies such an exemption?  A new business 
should not be exempted from labor and employment law simply 
because it has “cool” technology.  Is there a reason that gig businesses 
deserve special treatment even better than that of non-profits, which 
have to pay minimum wage and follow the other aspects of the labor 
and employment laws?  The premise of the argument is difficult to 
accept as the platform economy is largely for-profit and comprised of 
workers who are plying a trade that more or less mimics other work 
done as a full-time profession for remuneration. 
Some of this confusion and the calls for exemptions certainly come 
from the obfuscated language that platform companies use and the 
rhetoric around their origins.  The “sharing economy” began as a way 
for neighbors to assist each other and to engage in more sustainable 
modes of production.  Rather than ownership, participants in the 
sharing economy were interested in gaining access to resources that 
would be held in common as shared resources.268  Based on models of 
community volunteerism and pooled assets, such as lending libraries 
and tool collections, the sharing economy sought to reduce 
consumption and increase access to resources.  For example, early 
commercials for Lyft in the Bay Area showed neighbors assisting their 
friends and neighbors without cars, making it more feasible to exist 
without a car in an area that was already jammed with traffic.269  The 
sharing economy was seen as a “green,” more sustainable choice that 
avoided excess consumption.270  The idea of giving others a ride 
                                                          
 268. Juho Hamari et al., The Sharing Economy:  Why People Participate in Collaborative 
Consumption, 67 J. ASS’N FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 2047, 2048 (2015) (describing the 
individual economic benefits as well as the collective interest in the environment of 
“sharing, helping others, and engaging in sustainable behavior”). 
 269. See Maureen Morrison, Lyft’s First Big Ad Campaign:  We’re Not Just a 
Transportation Service, We Create Community, ADVERT. AGE (Jan. 27, 2015), 
http://adage.com/article/digital/lyft-launches-national-campaign/296819 
(emphasizing Lyft’s campaign in San Francisco, where it was founded, focusing on 
humanity, technology, and community); What Is Lyft?, YOUTUBE (Mar. 26, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X2bQdf408T8. 
 270. See Miriam A. Cherry & Winifred R. Poster, Crowdwork, Corporate Social 
Responsibility, and Fair Labor Practices, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON DIGITAL 
TRANSFORMATIONS 291, 293 (F. Xavier Olleros & Majlinda Zhegu eds., 2016) 
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within the community and helping out one’s neighbors was akin to 
volunteerism; payments were to help out with the cost of owning and 
garaging a car in the Bay Area, not to constitute a substitute for full-
time employment. 
Other crowdwork platforms with innovative business models 
developed based on a “prosumer” idea in which those who do work 
for the platform (producers) also comprise the audience for the work 
(the consumers).  For example, on the Threadless platform, 
designers can work on creating new styles for T-shirts.271  The 
community votes on the designs to be produced and has first access 
to purchase the T-shirts.  The designer then profits by receiving a 
portion of the shirt sales as compensation for their work.272  This type 
of work defies many of the traditional characteristics of either 
employees or independent contractors. 
The problem, as we noted before, is distinguishing between 
authentic innovators, who could compete on a level playing field or 
who have a distinct and interesting new business model, and those 
platforms that are profiteers who exist “only because [of] the current 
haze of legal and regulatory uncertainty.”273  Arbitrageurs who are 
merely looking for legal loopholes to undercut traditional service 
providers through cheap labor are not creating a “special” or 
“different” form of business that would deserve an exemption from 
labor and employment law.  But business models that either are truly 
“sharing,” some mix of profit and non-profit (for example, “B” 
corporations),274 or those that engage in prosumer transactions, 
genuinely might deserve a break from labor regulations.  To the 
extent that the sharing economy is about green choices and involves 
shared ownership and resources, there should be a safe harbor 
created if the work looks more like volunteerism undertaken for 
altruistic reasons or community-minded motivations. 
                                                          
(“Crowdwork already presents a myriad of environmental benefits, as the use of 
technology and remote work has the potential to reduce fuel from daily 
commuting.”); see also Morrison, supra note 269 (describing Lyft’s intention to 
combine “humanity and technology”). 
 271. THREADLESS, https://www.threadless.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 272. For more on Threadless, see JEFF HOWE, CROWDSOURCING:  WHY THE POWER OF 
THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS 1–3, 6, 8, 228–29, 281, 285 (2008). 
 273. Jeff Bercovici, Why the Next Uber Wannabe Is Already Dead, INC.COM (Nov. 2015), 
http://www.inc.com/magazine/201511/jeff-bercovici/the-1099-bind.html. 
 274. See Miriam A. Cherry, The Law and Economics of Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Greenwashing¸ 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 281, 294 (2014) (describing “B” 
corporations that benefit the environment and communities). 
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There are also some instances where the provision of a service is de 
minimis and thus does not merit employee status.  For example, if a 
businessperson used a ridesharing service once a week to pick up her 
neighbor on her way into work, that businessperson should not 
considered be an employee of Lyft.  Neither are those who use Uber 
pool or a similar mobile app service to set up and participate in a 
carpool to save fuel, parking, and expenses.  Nor are we suggesting 
that a person who signs up to do a fifteen-minute task on TaskRabbit 
once a month is an employee of the platform.  These activities seem 
to be de minimis or one-off, casual transactions that should not 
amount to an employment relationship.  Trying to sweep those 
extremely casual forms of work into burdensome legalities would 
serve no one.  Rather, we are more concerned with platforms that 
seem to be competing with, or in some instances replacing, full-time 
paid employment with on-demand work.275 
The concept of a threshold percentage of income or time to 
determine the safe harbor seems a sensible one.  At this point we are in 
no place to determine exactly where to set such a threshold, but it 
would serve to separate out an occasional temp or the carpooling Uber 
driver from those who are working a solid number of hours on the 
platform.  Could this look like eight hours per week, roughly only one 
working day?  Likewise, we do not want to discourage neighbors or 
volunteers from providing their services to others in their community 
when those efforts are truly voluntary or used only to defray legitimate 
expenses.  The safe harbor could be constituted in such a way that it 
would sweep in these forms of volunteerism or altruistic work. 
E. Broader Implications 
The gig economy has brought several economic and labor tensions 
to the forefront:  the need for managerial power and stability versus 
the need for flexibility; traditional organizational dependency versus 
working for multiple platforms; the choice to label as a self-employed 
worker versus such “coerced” labeling in a EULA; geographic diffusion 
versus efforts toward a collective voice for crowdworkers.  As we wrote 
in the previous section, these features define the gig-economy as a 
subset of a much broader trend:  the contingent, precarious, and 
increasingly fissured workplace.  The new standard is the so-called non-
standard work.  As a consequence, we resist the notion that all will be 
well when we have created a separate contractual category for gig 
                                                          
 275. See, e.g., Janine Berg, Income Security in the On-Demand Economy:  Findings and Policy 
Lessons from a Survey of Crowdworkers, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 543, 570–71 (2016). 
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workers.  Rather, we aim to look for solutions that will ameliorate 
conditions for other forms of precarious work in the workplace. 
If we are looking for reforms that would genuinely advance the 
welfare of gig workers, we could look to some suggested reforms for 
crowdwork.  One of the authors describes standards for decent 
crowdwork in a recent paper, focusing on fair wages, transparency, and 
due process.276  Fair wages may be self-explanatory, but the other two 
categories may be less obvious.  Suffice it to say that transparency 
involves clear listing of payment for work completed as well as accurate 
time estimates for how long it takes to complete the work.  It also 
would include some disclosure of information so that crowdworkers 
especially would be able to understand what goals or projects their 
small tasks were advancing.277  Additionally, it would include sharing 
information about the companies that use the platform, including 
information like whether they pay promptly and treat crowdworkers 
fairly.  Finally, due process would prevent wage theft and allow workers 
to contest or question a poor rating before it would be used against 
them.278  Workers need security, and a solution could be “to expand 
the scope of labour protection beyond employment.”279 
CONCLUSION 
Calls for a new “dependent contractor” hybrid category in the 
United States reflexively appear as an attractive and easy solution, 
especially as they are touted as being tailor-made for the gig economy.  
That initial reaction, however, is tempered upon further study of the 
content and history of the implementation of the third category in 
other nations.  In this paper we have examined the hybrid worker 
categories in Canada, Italy, and Spain to learn from their experiences. 
In Italy, the adoption of the third category led to widespread 
arbitrage of the categories with businesses moving employees into a 
“bogus” discounted status in the quasi-subordinate category.  In 
Spain, the requirements for attaining the third category were 
burdensome enough that the third category only is applicable to a 
small number of workers.  Viewed in this light, experimenting with a 
third category might be seen as more risky than just the easy or 
obvious solution as it first appears. 
                                                          
 276. See Cherry & Poster, supra note 270. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. See Fudge, supra note 9, at 633–34 (arguing against seeing employment “as a 
personal bilateral contract characterized by subordination”). 
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Rather than risking arbitrage between the categories, and the 
possibility that some workers will actually end up losing rights, it 
makes sense to think about employment status as the default rule for 
most gig workers, except those that may fit into a safe harbor because 
they are either not working very much (true “amateurs”) or are 
engaged in volunteerism for altruistic reasons (truly “sharing”).  If 
there is to be a third category, one like Canada’s “dependent 
contractor,” which expands the scope of the employment 
relationship, would best meet the needs of gig workers.  Such a 
default rule or expanded definition makes sense whether we are 
thinking about gig workers, those in fissured workplaces, franchises, 
or other non-standard or contingent work arrangements.  The gig 
economy is only the most visible or extreme example of workplace 
fissuring, but they are all part of the same larger trend. 
